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The Costs of "Fee Speech"--Restrictions
on the Use of Union Dues to Fund
New Organizing
by JENNIFER FRIESEN*
Introduction
Unions depend for most of their revenues on the dues and fees paid
by the workers they represent.' Typically unions use these funds for
such core workplace purposes as contract negotiation and grievance ad-
justment, maintenance of union property, staff salaries, publications to
represented workers, and benefits not paid under the collective bargain-
ing agreement.2 Unions are also commonly authorized by their member-
ship to spend dues on extra-workplace activities thought to enhance the
union's strength internally and in the community. These activities may
include union conventions and social events, lobbying for labor or social
legislation, contributions to political candidates or ballot proposition
campaigns, charitable contributions to community groups, scholarships
or public education, and organizing nonunion employees. This Article
examines the status of this last use of union dues-to "organize the unor-
ganized."3 A recent Supreme Court decision forbidding private sector
* Professor of Law, Loyola, Los Angeles; B.A. (1972) University of Kansas; J.D. (1978)
University of Oregon. The generous help of my colleagues Chris May and Marcy Strauss and
my research assistants Wayne Clayton and Alene Games contributed greatly to this Article.
1. Monthly dues in most unions are set at about twice the hourly wage rate. They are
collected by the local union and allocated between local and national union treasuries, usually
with half to each. Henkel & Wood, Limitations on the Uses of Union Shop Funds After Ellis:
What Activities Are "Germane" to Collective Bargaining?, 35 LAB. L.J. 736, 743-44 (1984)
(citing Hickman, Labor Organizations'Fees and Dues, 100 MoNTHLY LAB. REv. No. 5, at 21-
22 (1977)).
2. See, eg., Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 NOTRE DAME L. Rrv. 61,
62 (1983) [hereinafter Uses and Abuses].
3. Union organizing is very expensive. In addition to the salary of the staff organizer and
printing costs for the usual leaflets, the union may also need to pay for costly media messages
to reach the employees and rent a meeting hall and office space near their workplace. Unions
will also incur legal costs if there are unfair labor practice charges or legal challenges to the
outcome of an election. It has been estimated that one-third of national union expenditures are
made for organizing purposes. Henkel & Wood, supra note 1, at 744.
Organizing costs are increased by labor law decisions restricting union access to employ-
ees. Employers are not ordinarily required to grant non-employee union organizers access to
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unions from funding organizing activities with objecting employees'
dues4 undermines national labor policy and is not justified by either the
federal labor statutes or the First Amendment.
The currency of this question is dramatized by reports of shrinking
union ranks:' as the labor community marked the fiftieth anniversary of
the passage of the 1935 Wagner Act,6 the unionized percentage of the
workforce was declining to a figure approaching the level of the early
1930s.7 Although there are a number of reasons for the decline, the sur-
est way of arresting it is probably through new organizing efforts. At the
same time, when unions undertake to organize,8 they are met with an
increasing level of employer resistance, both lawful and unlawful,9 sub-
plant premises to distribute literature, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956),
nor to supply organizers with names or addresses of employees in the crucial beginning stages
of a campaign, Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). An employer may re-
quire all employees to attend a "captive audience" meeting to hear anti-union messages of the
employer but is not generally obliged to give the union "equal time" to respond on plant
premises, even when the employer's speech is coercive and unlawful. NLRB v. United Steel-
workers (Nutone and Avondale), 357 U.S. 357 (1958); see United Steelworkers v. NLRB
(Florida Steel Corp.), 646 F.2d 616 (D.C, Cir. 1981) (discussing when NLRB will order
"union access" as a remedy for an unfair labor practice).
4. Last Term, the Supreme Court affirmed a Fourth Circuit decision that disallowed-
among other challenged expenditures, mostly political ones-the use without employees' con-
sent of private sector union dues for organizing. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck,
776 F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en bane), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
2641 (1988). The effect of this and similar cases on union treasuries is significant. The trial
court in Beck ordered nearly 80% of the union's dues refunded to the plaintiffs. Id. at 2645-
46.
5. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. The treatment of organizing expenses cri-
tiqued in this Article is a recent expansion of judge-made rules that restrict the use of union
dues for political purposes. As applied to unions' political activities, these rules have provoked
considerable scholarly comment. See infra note 20. Almost no attention has been given to the
effect of these rules on union organizing. Brief references to the problem may be found in
Henkel & Wood, supra note 1, and Shea, Unions, Union Membership, and Union Security, 11
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 63-64 (1987).
6. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 541 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-68 (1982)).
7. See infra p. 642.
8. Some figures show that union expenditures for organizing have been declining, rather
than rising, to meet the challenge of membership losses. In 1953, unions spent $1.03 per non-
union member for organizing; in 1974, they spent $0.71, an overall decline of 30% (measured
in constant dollars). R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 229 (1984).
Whether or not the decrease in these particular expenditures is caused by restricting use of
nonmembers' union dues, economic theory predicts that the decrease could at least be rein-
forced and accelerated by restrictions. See infra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
9. Professor Weiler has documented an astronomic increase in the number of unfair la-
bor practices by employers aimed at stopping union organizational drives. According to
figures supplied by the National Labor Relations Board, the number of employees found enti-
tled to reinstatement after being unlawfully fired for union activity increased 1000% between
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stantially raising organization costs. Associated with the increase in em-
ployer opposition is a decrease in election successes for unions, and in the
number of employees added to union ranks after the union wins an elec-
tion. 10 This climate intensifies a need for reliable sources of funding for
new organization at precisely the time when the Supreme Court is re-
stricting the use of union dues for this purpose.
Part I of this Article describes the background and summarizes the
problems of the Court's "fee speech" doctrine, which bans the use of
objecting employees' union dues for purposes other than those connected
with bargaining unit representation. Part II briefly examines the
Supreme Court's statutory and first amendment justifications for the doc-
trine. Part III discusses whether the First Amendment compels the ap-
plication of the doctrine to union organizing.11 The Article concludes
that the use of union dues for organizing efforts should not be restricted
and suggests amending the federal labor laws to accomodate the legiti-
1957 and 1980. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HAPv. L. REv. 1769, 1780 (1983) [hereinafter Promises to Keep]; see also
Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representa-
tion, 98 HARv. L. REv. 351 (1984).
10. Professor Weiler reports a decline both in the union victory rate in certification elec-
tions (from 74% in 1950 to 48% in 1980) and in the percentage of voters included in union
victories (from 85% in 1950 to 37% in 1980). Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 9, at 1776-
77.
11. Three different questions might arise in a dispute over how union dues can be spent:
whether the expenditure is authorized by the membership, whether it is authorized or prohib-
ited by a statute, and, finally, whether it is prohibited by a constitutional command. This
Article is concerned only with the last two questions.
Whether a particular expense is authorized by the membership remains important, how-
ever, even if no additional constraints are imposed by statute or constitution. A union officer
who spends funds for purposes unauthorized or prohibited by the union's own constitution,
by-laws, or rules is liable under federal law for return of the funds to the treasury. Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976). The
LMRDA also enacted the "workers' bill of rights," guaranteeing members full political rights
to vote, run for office, and exercise their rights to speak in regard to internal union affairs.
LMRDA Title I §§ 101-105, PuB. L. No. 86-257, 73 STAT. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 401 et seq. (1976)). A membership bent on frugality or political inoffensiveness could use
internal union democratic processes to limit the purposes to which all union dues, whether
voluntary or involuntary, could be spent.
Plaintiffs in modern cases do not often invoke this "no authority" theory, doubtless be-
cause organizational and political expenditures are typically approved by union rules. Before
the advent of rules based on the First Amendment or national labor legislation, however, the
propriety of union expenditures was commonly tested only by whether the rules were properly
authorized. See, eg., DeMille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 139, 187 P.2d 769
(1947) (rejecting argument that the First Amendment requires refund to dissenter of dues
spent to defeat a right-to-work law, where assessment and expenditure were authorized by
union membership). Authorized union expenditures for organizational campaigns would not
violate the fiduciary duty of § 501, see McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1976)
(a union's political expenditures not actionable under § 501 to the extent they are authorized
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mate interests of individual employees and the institutional interests of
the unions that represent them.12
I. Background and Summary of the Problem
Not all workers represented by unions pay dues and fees voluntarily;
many are required to do so as a condition of keeping their jobs. Private
sector unions operating outside the twenty-one "right-to-work" states13
generally negotiate with the employer for some type of contractual union
security device. A clause requiring union "membership" as a condition
of continued employment is most common.14 This requirement can be
satisfied, at the worker's option, by subscribing as a full union member or
by the union's constitution, by-laws, or resolutions), or federal civil rights statutes, see Lohr v.
Association of Catholic Teachers, 416 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (religious objection).
Thus, if no statutory or constitutional rule requires limits on organizational funding, such
expenditures will ordinarily be governed by majority rule of the members.
12. The problem of agency preemption is not addressed in this Article. The Supreme
Court's most recent "fee speech" opinion interprets the NLRA not to authorize the challenged
expenditures, avoiding constitutional doubts. Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct.
2641, 2657 (1988). So long as the doctrine is putatively statutory, alleged violations of the
NLRA should be decided by the agency that Congress designated for this purpose-the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. In these controversial cases, though, plaintiffs are permitted
direct access to federal court by suing the union for breach of its judicially implied "duty of
fair representation," an exception to the traditionally exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Id. at
2647. The Court in Beck found that the union failed to represent the interests of all workers
fairly and without hostility-thus breaching the duty-when it made the challenged expendi-
tures. Id, To reach this result, the Court interpreted the NLRA not to authorize this use of
plaintiffs' fees, but it viewed this question as a "collateral issue" not committed to the NLRB's
exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
13. Twenty-one states in the South, Midwest, and West have limited or banned union
security agreements within their boundaries. W. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR
LAW 50-51 (2d ed. 1986). In these states, employees are privileged to withold payment of all
union dues. Accordingly, the "fee speech" doctrine has significance only in the remaining 29
states.
14. The NLRA tolerates but does not compel collective bargaining agreements that re-
quire membership in the union as a condition of continued employment. When there is such
an agreement, all workers in an elected union's designated "bargaining unit" must become
members within thirty days of hire (seven days in the construction industry). See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(3), 158(f)(2) (1983). The resulting arrangement is called a "union shop." The terms
of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA permit the union to require contribution of an amount equal to
regular dues from all bargaining unit members. Employees whose religious convictions are
offended by union membership are allowed, under a 1980 amendment to the NLRA, to make a
contribution equivalent to dues to a nonreligious, nonlabor, tax-exempt charity. Pub. L. No.
96-593, 94 Stat. 3452 (1980) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1982). The Railway
Labor Act also authorizes union shop agreements. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1983).
A variation on the union shop common in the public sector is the "agency shop"; workers
need not become members, but they must tender "agency fees" in lieu of dues to cover the
costs of representation. In practice, the agency shop is indistinguishable from a union shop.
See Clark, A Guide to the Changing Court Rulings on Union Security in the Public Sector A
Management Perspective, 14 J.L. & EDuc. 71, n.1 (1985) (listing 20 states that authorize the
['Vol. 15:603
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simply by paying the equivalent of union dues as a "financial core" mem-
ber. I5 Under these agreements, the employer, at the union's request, may
discharge a covered worker who refuses to pay. Although these agree-
ments compel a degree of unwanted association, they are generally held
permissible under the First Amendment because of the governmental in-
terest in assuring that all who benefit from them share the costs of
representation. 16
According to the Court, however, the First Amendment does limit
the purposes for which even a private sector union may spend the dues
and fees generated by union security agreements. 17  Employees fre-
quently ask courts to prohibit unions from financing political campaigns,
lobbying, and other "ideological" activities with their mandatory union
dues or fees. Unions have lost most of these battles in the Supreme
negotiation of agency shop or "fair share" agreements covering public employees); Note, De-
velopments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1611, 1726-34 (1984).
In addition, unions with union shop or agency shop contracts typically try to secure a
"dues check-off" clause. This means that dues are deducted from employees' paychecks by
the employer and remitted directly to the union. Union shop and check-off agreements are
obviously crucial to the planning and administration of the union's budget; a check-off provi-
sion also spares the considerable costs of collecting dues from unwilling members. For these
reasons, employers frequently resist such clauses on the ground that they are "not going to
give aid and comfort to the enemy." See, eg., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 101
(1970).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 83% of private sector agreements outside the
right-to-work states provide for some type of union security; a union shop provision, found in
72% of the agreements, is the most common device. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. 1421-25, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: UNION
SECURITY AND DUES CHECKOFF PROVISIONS 5 (1982).
15. See generally T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE
COURTS (1977); Shea, supra note 5, at 6-10. Any worker covered by a contract that requires
union "membership" can nevertheless refuse to become a full member. The Supreme Court
interprets the union security portion of National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1982), to mean that a union can require nothing more from unwilling workers
than the payment of dues and fees; it cannot compel the worker to take an oath of member-
ship, sign a membership card, attend union meetings, or adhere to union disciplinary meas-
ures, which are all obligations of the full member. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41
(1954); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963); Shea, supra note 5 at 4.
These "financial core" members are often the plaintiffs in cases challenging union expendi-
tures of their dues.
16. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Abood v. Detroit Board of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (some infringement of first amendment interests justified in order
to prevent "free riders" from obtaining union services without paying for them).
17. Ellis v. Bd. of Ry., Airline, and S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984). Ellis involved a
dues suit under the Railway Labor Act. The Court has assumed that governmental action
sufficient to trigger the first amendment is present in RLA cases. In the recent Beck opinion,
the Court stated it "need not decide" whether the exercise of rights derived from the NLRA
also involves governmental action. 108 S. Ct. at 2656. See infra notes 63-67.
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Court"8 as the Court has gradually developed strict prohibitions on cer-
tain uses of "financial core" members' funds. These prohibitions apply in
both the private and the public sectors. Although the private sector rule
is formally cast as a construction of federal collective bargaining law, the
doctrine in both private and public sectors really rests upon the theory
that the use of members' money to promote causes with which they disa-
gree offends notions of free speech and association.19 Forced subsidiza-
18. The battles have been fought chiefly by the National Right to Work Committee and
the AFL-CIO. Between 1969 and 1975, the National Right to Work Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Foundation supplied counsel or financial support for more than 60 employees suing
their unions. The Foundation has achieved a string of significant victories, participating in or
supporting most of the landmark cases limiting use of compulsory dues, including Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Ellis v. Bd of Ry., Airline, and S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S.
435 (1984) and Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988).
The National Right to Work Committee, founded by a group of employers, now functions
through its tax-exempt Foundation as a sort of legal aid society for employees who wish to sue
their unions for return of dues. The Committee itself, a tax-exempt, non-profit organization,
opposes "compulsory unionism" through education and support of "right-to-work" legisla-
tion. Although it now maintains that it is free from employer control, the Committee contin-
ues to receive most of its funding from employers. See UAW v. National Right to Work Legal
Defense Found., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 474 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd sub nom, Internat'l Union, UAW
v. Nat'l Right to Work Legal Defense and Educ. Found., Inc., 590 F.2d 1139, 1150, 1153
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
On the other side, unions defend these suits with their own counsel. Litigation costs are
still lawfully paid out of dues, even over the objection of the right-to-work plaintiffs.
19. Before its recent Beck decision expanded the doctrine to all unions covered by the
NLRA, the Supreme Court had announced its fee speech rules in two separate lines of cases,
one involving transportation workers unions in the private sector, which are governed by the
federal Railway Labor Act, and the other involving public employee unions. In the private
sector, the rule was first inferred from § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, which permits
an employer and union to enter into an agreement requiring union membership. See Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). The Court held that Congress had
implicitly forbidden the use of objecting employees' funds for political campaigns, which the
Court found were "purposes unrelated to contract negotiation and enforcement." Id. at 744.
In Street, the Court strongly suggested that even absent such a construction, enough govern-
mental action was present in the Congressional authorization of such private contracts to re-
quire the same result under the First Amendment. Id. at 749; see infra notes 57-67 and
accompanying text. In Beck, the Court shied away from this language in Street, stating that it
"need not decide whether the exercise of rights permitted, though not compelled, by § 8(a)(3)
involves state action." 108 S. Ct. at 2656. Thus, the NLRA rule is, like the RLA rule, cast as
statutory interpretation. Id. at 2657.
A pure first amendment-based rule applies to public sector unions. In the leading case
brought by public school teachers, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), Michi-
gan's collective bargaining statute had been interpreted by the state court to permit authorized
lobbying and political expenditures. The Court nevertheless relied on Street to find that the
first amendment rights of dissenting employees required a refund of fees spent to advance
political campaigns and other ideological activities that were not "germane" to collective bar-
gaining. Id. at 236. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
The chief difference between the formulas is that proof of a first amendment violation
requires a showing that the communication caused an ideological offense. The statutory
formula requires only a showing that the expenditure was not necessary to represent the plain-
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tion of union expression is said to be the equivalent of a government-
compelled affirmation of belief, which has long been held to be a viola-
tion of the First Amendment. 20
This fee speech doctrine was first applied to prohibit the use of dues
to finance political candidates and causes that a worker opposed. 21 From
this base, however, the doctrine expanded dramatically in scope. In its
statutory version, the fee speech doctrine now forbids the compelled sub-
sidy of almost any union expenditure not closely related to the rather
narrow service categories of workplace contract negotiations, contract
administration, or grievance adjustment. The current rule in the private
sector is articulated in the interpretation of the implied limits of union
security under the Railway Labor Act 22 announced in Ellis:
tiff. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. In a suit challenging payment for union
social hours, Justice White alluded to this difference when he wrote, "[P]etitioners may feel
their money is not being well spent, but that does not mean that they have a First Amendment
complaint." Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456. The Supreme Court has rebuffed attempts by lower courts
to eliminate the ideological element of Abood's constitutional test. See Hudson v. Chicago
Teachers Union, 743 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1986) (all expenditures that are not germane to col-
lective bargaining process are impermissible, even if not political or ideological), rev'd on other
grounds, 475 U.S.292, 303, n. 13 (1986) (finding it unnecessary to reach issue of non-germane,
non-ideological expenditures).
20. The doctrine has come under-heavy fire from dissenting justices and from labor and
constitutional scholars. The best and most cited scholarly criticism of the application of the
government action doctrine to a private sector union is Wellington, The Constitution, The
Labor Union, and "GovernmentalAction," 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961). On the division between
conventional collective bargaining and political activity the scholarly criticism is both empiri-
cal and legal. Some commentators argue that lobbying and candidate support are not optional,
but essential to effective representation in a government-regulated economy. See, eg., Cantor,
Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Associa-
tion, 36 RtrGERs L. REv. 3, 44-46 (1983) [hereinafter Forced Payments]; Cantor, Uses and
Abuses, supra note 2; Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmas for
Liberal Legalism, 60 TEx. L. Rnv. 1 (1981). Professor Hyde goes so far as to prophesy that
ordinary collective bargaining in the private sector will inevitably be replaced by political ad-
vocacy, as employers become more dependent on government planning and regulation. Id. at
3-4.
21. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 744 (1961).
22. The longstanding question whether the Court would transplant either constitutional
or statutory limits on the use of dues to unions governed by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)-the vast majority of American labor organizations- was resolved against the union
in Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988). The Court took the
statutory route, relying on precedents under the nearly identical Railway Labor Act, and ex-
pressly incorporating the Ellis formula into its intepretation of § 8(a)(3). Id. at 2657. The test
for both statutes is now identical.
In Beck the Fourth Circuit had imposed upon the union a statutory duty, inferred from
the NLRA, to refrain from spending any amount of the dues of objecting employees "beyond
the requirements for purposes of collective bargaining, grievance adjustment or contract ad-
ministration." 776 F.2d 1187, 1281 (4th Cir. 1985) (panel opinion) (Beck1). As applied, this
formula excluded, among other categories, "political" expenses, lobbying expenses for labor
legislation, strike support for sister unions, organizing expenses, and the cost of union publica-
Summer 19881
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[T]he test must be whether the challenged expenditures are neces-
sarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the du-
ties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with
the employer on labor-management issues. Under this standard,
objecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of
not only the direct cost of negotiating and administering a collec-
tive-bargaining contract and of settling grievances and disputes,
but also the expenses of activities or undertakings normally or rea-
sonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the
union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargain-
ing unit.2 3
The Court's focus has shifted from a concern with avoiding com-
pelled association with political causes to a very different concern with
ensuring economic fairness to the dues payor or service consumer. The
protesting worker can constitutionally be charged for representation
services that relate immediately to her economic well-being, even though
she may have conscientious objections to being represented at all. She
cannot be charged, however, for any activity, ideological or not, from
which the Court believes she is not likely to receive a measurable gain in
the workplace. Many majority-authorized union expenditures will be in-
eligible for mandatory funding under this test. Political activity of any
kind will probably run afoul of the rule. Moreover, the Court in Ellis for
the first time disapproved of expenses that are not conventionally
political.24
tions about such "ideological" activities. Id at 1210-12. The opinion rendered en bane, after
rehearing, reached the same result as the earlier panel opinion, and adopted much of its rea-
soning. 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (Beck I1).
The circuits were divided on the substantive questions presented by Beck. The Ninth
Circuit had extended the rationale of the Street and Abood cases to the NLRA. Seay v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970) (cause of action stated under both duty
of fair representation and First Amendment). The Second and Tenth Circuits had expressed
the opposite view. See Price v. Auto Workers, 795 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986) (no cause of
action under either First Amendment or duty of fair representation), petition for cert. granted,
judgment vacated and remanded in light of Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S.
Ct. 2890 (1988); Reid v. McDonell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1971) (no cause of
action under First Amendment; duty of fair representation issue left open).
23. 466 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added). The "bargaining unit" is the group of employees
the local union represents. All employees in the bargaining unit are eligible to vote for or
against the union in the election. If the union receives a majority of the votes cast, it has both
the power and the obligation to represent all employees in the unit, whether or not they are
union supporters or members. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) ("Representatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.").
24. The Ellis opinion disallowed the cost of organizing workers outside the established
bargaining unit. The Court disallowed organizing expenses because they were spent on em-
ployees outside the union's bargaining unit; only "the most attenuated benefits" could flow to
those already represented from increasing union strength. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 452. The opinion
[Vol. 15:603
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The fee speech rule takes Thomas Jefferson almost at his word:2" it
prevents unions from compelling contributions of money for the propa-
gation of at least some opinions that the dissenting worker disbelieves.
For those who believe that freedom of speech or belief is impaired by the
use of a dissenting worker's money, the fee speech doctrine has a positive
effect. But favoring liberty interests also has its costs, most of which
stem from reducing the union's financial resources. This is of practical
import for the majority of employees who are willingly represented and
charged: their unions will be less effective in achieving work-related ben-
efits through political or organizational means.
For unions as institutions, the rule creates three problems. First, it
saddles the union with what economists call a classical free rider prob-
lem: some workers do in fact benefit from political advocacy and other
services for which they do not have to pay. Second, because the Court
also disallowed the costs of litigation to protect the rights of airline employees generally, when
such litigation had no close connection with the bargaining unit. Id at 453.
After a long silent spell, the case law on "chargeability" is now developing. The cases
generally hold that the following expenses are nonchargeable to the dues of the dissenting
employee: litigation to advance workers' interests generally, lobbying for changes in labor
laws, support of political candidates, loans to support affiliated unions, charitable contribu-
tions, and publications in regard to any activity not itself chargeable. See Ellis, 466 U.S. at
448; Beck I, 776 F.2d at 1210-12; Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 1306, 1327
(W.D. Mich. 1986) (loan to support affiliated union's strike not chargeable to dissenters);
Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 183 Cal. App. 3d 581, 213 Cal. Rptr. 326
(1985), rev, granted 701 P.2d 1170, 215 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1985) (organizing and recruitment
costs and charitable contribution to Martin Luther King, Jr., scholarship fund not chargeable
to dissenters). Cf Associated Builders & Contractors v. Carpenters Vacation and Holiday
Trust Fund, 700 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1983) (organizing chargeable when directed at reducing
nonunion competition for jobs); Price v. UAW, 795 F.2d 1128, 1135 (2d Cir. 1986) (organiz-
ing, scholarships, and strike support held to be normal and reasonable expenses of modem
unions and thus chargeable to all represented employees). Pr'ce stood alone in its broad judg-
ment of expenses chargeable by NLRA unions. It was vacated and remanded when the Court
affirmed Beck. 108 S. Ct. 2890 (1988).
Expenses generally held chargeable include staff and overhead expenses allocated to con-
tract negotiation and grievance handling, national union conventions, refreshments at union
social events, and litigation to enforce a collective bargaining agreement covering the dissent-
ing employees. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448-53.
When a category of expenditures is deemed nonchargeable, the union is obliged to rebate
to objecting employees their pro rata shares of the dues expended for the nonchargeable pur-
pose, and to reduce any future dues by the same proportion. The union may not constitution-
ally adopt a pure rebate program, exacting full dues and refunding the objectionable portion
later. A pure rebate system is inadequate because it permits the union to obtain an involuntary
loan for purposes objectionable to the employee: "[Tihe union cannot be allowed to commit
dissenters' funds to improper uses even temporarily." Id at 443-44.
25. Speaking of religious establishment, Jefferson wrote, "[To compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical." I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354 (1948), quoted in Chicago
Teacher's Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305, n.15 (1986).
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does not apply a similar rule to corporations in behalf of dissenting
shareholders or ratepayers, the union's chief adversary in the nonunion
workplace and in the political marketplace has a competitive advan-
tage.26 Third, the rule may undercut democratic processes within the
union by encouraging dissidents to resort to the courts instead of partici-
pating in union policy-making.
The fee speech rule's fiscal impact on unions also poses negative
consequences for society at large. The redistributive, welfare-type laws
that unions promote through political channels usually benefit groups of
unrepresented, poor citizens who have no other equally effective voice in
Congress.27 Continuing decreases in the size of the union workforce,28
due in great part to the failure of new organizing efforts, will also have ill
effects on the American economy as consumer purchasing power declines
and low-paid or unemployed workers increasingly rely on public assist-
ance.29 Finally, the restriction on free use of union dues for political
activities may impair the free functioning of a democratic political sys-
tem that relies on the pluralism of interest groups to inform and persuade
legislators and other governmental policy makers.3"
Despite powerful criticisms of the statutory and constitutional foun-
dations for the fee speech rule and its broad social and economic effects,
the Supreme Court remains committed to enforcing limits on the use of
union shop dues. The rule has serious difficulties even as applied to most
partisan political expenditures. This Article primarily argues, however,
that the fee speech rule sweeps too broadly when it inhibits the funding
of organizing the unorganized worker. The special policy considerations
associated with union organizing activities and the weak rationale for
26. Free speech and other rules generally permit corporations to subsidize ideological
messages out of funds contributed by unconsenting shareholders or ratepayers. See Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (striking down state law that
prohibited monopoly utility from inserting messages promoting nuclear power into billing en-
velopes); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (corporate contributions
to influence state ballot proposition campaign cannot constitutionally be prohibited despite
speech and associational interests of objecting shareholders); see also Theodora Holding Corp.
v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. 1969) (closely held corporation will not be dissolved because
of charitable contribution made over objection of minority shareholder).
The Court also has stated that it will not imply a private right of action for shareholders
seeking to enforce Congress' ban on corporate contributions to federal office seekers, but might
do so for similarly situated union members suing their union. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,
81-82 & n.13 (1975).
27. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 8, at 12-18.
28. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
29. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 8, at 248-50.
30. See, e.g., Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs
and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 237 (1984) ("The decline of unions means
trouble for the pluralist model.").
extending the fee speech doctrine to organizing expenditures warrants a
separate analysis of this particular expenditure.
The legal premises for the fee speech doctrine are stretched to the
breaking point when applied to organizational expenses. First, the rule is
not compelled by any statute, even in the private sector. Nothing in the
federal collective bargaining statutes, nor in their legislative history, ad-
dresses the purposes for which a union may use lawfully collected
funds."a The Court's opinions, taken as a whole, essentially concede that
the doctrine is sustainable only because necessary to accomodate first
amendment-based doubts about compelling such financial subsidies. But
if that is so, then the limiting construction of the statute must go no
further than the Constitution requires-to do more fails to respect the
will of Congress.
The fee speech doctrine arguably went beyond what the Constitu-
tion required when it evolved from a rights protective rule concerned
with forced political association to a general dictate that union expenses
must be "reasonably and necessarily incurred" for the demonstrable ben-
efit of the protester or her bargaining unit. As applied, this statutory
formula deems organizational expenditures unauthorized by Congress
because the benefit to the payor is not immediate. But it is not clear that
the constitution mandates this formula or its application to a collective
goal such as increasing union strength. A constitutional analysis should
begin instead with an inquiry whether either the manner or the ideologi-
cal content of this particular union function significantly infringes first
amendment interests of union shop members.
First, using compelled contributions for union organizing drives
does not present the same evils that rules against government compelled
speech are meant to prevent. The Court normally hesitates to recognize
a right not to support others' speech when little possibility of public asso-
ciation of the message with the protester exists.32 Organizing is inher-
ently less public than politicking, and more likely to be perceived as an
institutional priority pursued by the leadership rather than by the mem-
bership. Second, the ideological content of organizing distinguishes it
from political activity. The First Amendment permits workers to be
charged the costs of their union's collective bargaining activities, even if
the workers morally disagree with these activities. Organizing promotes
collective bargaining opportunities for employees who are not yet in the
31. See infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
32. See, eg., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Wooley v. May-
nard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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union; it is otherwise indistinguishable from the kind of communicative
conduct that the rule holds can be charged to dissenting employees.
Third, it is unsatisfying to draw a constitutional distinction between
collective bargaining activities that benefit the payor immediately and or-
ganizing activities that bring collective bargaining to the unorganized
while benefitting the payor collaterally. Because increasing union
strength does benefit workers already represented as a group, the Court's
"free rider" rationale applies to organizing activities as well as to negotia-
tions. Finally, even if the free rider rationale alone does not justify
charging organizational costs, another governmental interest might do
so. By focusing exclusively on one union role-providing services to the
individual employee-the Court has overlooked a public interest in af-
fording all workers an opportunity to choose representation.33 This in-
terest becomes more compelling as the percentage of organized workers
declines, potentially resulting in a replication of the labor conditions that
prompted the enactment of the NLRA. But even as the need for new
organizing grows, the rules controlling use of union dues paid by "finan-
cial core" members inevitably will reduce the funds available for organiz-
ing activities. While the public interest in providing choice of
representation might not justify compelled funding of unions when they
act as political representatives, organizing new workplaces is squarely
within the union's expected, traditional role. Unlike political advocacy,
organizing cannot be performed by any other interest group.
II. Sources of the Doctrine-Statute or Constitution?
A. Federal Collective Bargaining Statutes
Congress might have chosen to regulate the various uses of dues.
However, even a generous reading of the two major federal collective
bargaining statutes and their legislative history does not justify the con-
clusion that Congress has done so.
The United States Code contains only one explicit limit on the use of
dues, and it affects only donations to campaigns for federal office.34 With
33. In passing the collective bargaining laws, Congress expressly intended to provide labor
an opportunity to choose representation. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) and infra notes 126-27.
34. One of the Taft-Hartley amendments made it a crime for labor unions to contribute
any portion of their regular dues (as opposed to separate voluntary contributions to political
action committees) to finance a campaign for United States congressional or presidential office.
Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1970)). The law, which likewise prohibits similar contributions from the treasuries of for-
profit corporations, was re-enacted by the Federal Election Campaign Act, and is now codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1983). Cf. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986)
(law against treasury fund donations unconstitutional as applied to non-profit corporation cre-
this exception, Congress probably contemplated that dues spending
would ordinarily be governed by majority rule of the represented em-
ployees. This non-regulation model was not noticeably disturbed when
Congress debated the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA,35
nor when it added union security provisions to the RLA in 1951,36 nor
ated to promote political ideas). The policy behind this statute was not exclusively or even
especially to protect the integrity of dissenting employees, but to insulate candidates from
undue influence. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948); United States v. Auto.
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570-87 (1957).
Of course Congress could not enact similar prohibitions on contributions to state cam-
paigns, whether for elective office or for ballot propositions, and such contributions remain
within the bailiwick of state law, so long as contribution limits do not run afoul of the First
Amendment. See, eg., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
35. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136-162, amending Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1982)).
When Congress overrode President Truman's veto to enact the Taft-Hartley Act, the use
of three provisions significantly weakened union security devices. First, the amendments
banned the powerful closed shop and replaced it with the union shop. The closed shop had
meant that the union could insist that only persons who were already members be hired, while
the union shop requires membership only after hire.
Second, Congress, in an unusual departure from the goal of national uniformity exacted
by most laws grounded on the Commerce Clause, gave states the option to pass laws that
would ban even willing employers from agreeing to an otherwise lawful union shop. 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(b) (1982) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by
State or Territorial law."). Where such "right-to-work laws" are in place, see supra note 13,
unions are rarely able to achieve 100% voluntary membership. Those who refuse to pay dues,
while partaking of the benefits of union wages and representation, are called "free riders." W.
GouLD, supra note 13, at 51. The percentage of free riders varies, but appears to be about
20% in southern right-to-work states. See Freeman & Medoff, New Estimates of Private Sector
Unionism in the United States, 32 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 143 (1979).
Third, the union shop amendments require unions to set "uniform" dues and to offer
membership to all without discrimination. No employee can be dismissed for nonmembership
if "membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring
or retaining membership." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). This proviso prevents the union
from coercing employees into political orthodoxy by conditioning membership on conformity
or personal support of the leadership. The amendment was bitterly opposed by unionists, who
believed it to be an unwarranted intrusion into the local's right to decide the qualifications for
membership in the organization.
36. The Railway Labor Act, which covers employees and employers in the railroad and
airline industries, was amended in 1951 to copy the NLRA's new union security section. Act
of Jan. 10, 1951, ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1983)); com-
pare 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1983) with 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). The debate on this
Act indicates that § 2, Eleventh, was intended "merely to extend to employees and employers
subject to the Railway Labor Act rights now possessed by employees and employers under the
Taft-Hartley Act in industry generally." Beck I, 776 F.2d 1187, 1197 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting
T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS 115 (1977)). Senator
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when it enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (LMRDA).37
Congress has refused to impose limits on either the amount of dues
collected by private sector unions or the uses to which the dues may be
put. Union security provisions under the NLRA do not address the uses
of dues. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it unlawful for an employer
to "discriminat[e] in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization. ' 38 Section 8(b)(2) creates a corollary duty in the
union not to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) .... Standing
alone, these sections would outlaw the most common kind of union se-
curity agreement, which permits the union to insist that nonpaying em-
ployees be discharged. Section 8(a)(3)'s general condemnation of pro-
union "discrimination" is, however, immediately followed by a specific
exemption for union security agreements.' The statute permits employ-
Taft, a co-author of § 8(a)(3), was explicit about the intent behind the virtual duplication of
language. He declared that § 2, Eleventh "inserts in the railway mediation law almost the
exact provisions... of the Taft-Hartley law, so that the conditions regarding the union shop
and the check-off are carried into the relations between railroad unions and railroads." Ia at
1197; Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, at 2651.
The only difference between the RLA and NLRA union security schemes is historical.
Before the 1951 union shop amendments, no provision existed for any union security in the
railway industry. In contrast, the union shop amendments replaced the closed shop in indus-
tries covered by the NLRA. Ia at 2653.
37. 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (Landrum-Griffin Act) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-
531 (1983)). During the debates on the LMRDA in 1958, Congress voted down the proposed
Potter Amendment, which would have allowed an employee to recover any portion of his dues
spent for other than "collective bargaining purposes." 104 CONG. RIc. 11330-43 (1958). See
McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976)
(legislative history of LMRDA indicates Congress specifically did not intend to limit political
expenditures through § 501 fiduciary duty). See also Leslie, Federal Courts and Union Fiduci-
aries, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1314, 1327 n.74 (1976) (summarizing legislative history).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). See supra note 20.
39. Id. § 158(b)(2).
40. The exemption states:
[Nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall pre-
clude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization... to re-
quire as a condition of employment membership therein . . . if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees [selected by the majority] as pro-
vided in section 159(a) of this title ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). This language is followed by the Taft-Hartley proviso, which
prevents a union with such an agreement from forcing the discharge of an employee for non-
membership if she has paid regular dues and initiation fees. See supra note 34.
Amended § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), declares the right of employees to
refrain from engaging in labor organizing activities. The right to refrain is also expressly quali-
fied "to the extent that such right may be affected by" a union security agreement authorized
by NRLA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
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ers and unions to agree to require employees to pay uniform dues and
initiation fees as a condition of their continued employment, without re-
gard to how these funds are spent.
Moreover, no evidence of any Congressional intent contrary to the
plain text appears in the legislative history. In fact, Congress rejected
attempts to limit levels of dues and union political expenditures, 41 though
members were well aware that unions did in fact use for political pur-
poses the "periodic dues and initiation fees" that section 8(a)(3) would
permit them to collect.42 The Senate-House compromise that became the
Taft-Hartley Act ultimately placed no restrictions on the uses of dues.43
41. In a strong dissenting opinion to Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia agreed that according to the legislative history, "Congress
affirmatively declined to place limitations on either the amount of dues a union could charge or
the use to which it could put those dues." 108 S. Ct. at 2663 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley debates on this issue is recounted in Cantor, Uses and
Abuses, supra note 2, at 72-75. Professor Cantor concludes that "Congress did not intend to
preclude union political expenditures from either union shop dues or agency shop fees." Id at
72. In a related article, he writes that "[n]ot only could Congress conclude that unions should
be able to collect agency fees for a full range of representational services, including lobbying,
but Congress did so conclude." Cantor, Forced Payments, supra note 20, at 41.
The House was aware and reportedly disturbed that a worker could be "compelled to
contribute to causes and candidates for public office to which he [is] opposed." H.R. REP. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), reprinted in I N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATONS AcT, 1947, at 295 (1948) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY]. The House then approved a bill to free workers from "unreasonable and discrimina-
tory financial demands," making it an unfair labor practice for a union to "impose any dues or
general or special assessments that ... are in excess of such reasonable amounts as the mem-
bers thereof ... shall authorize," or "to fine or discriminate against any member ... on
account of his having supported or failed to support any candidate for civil office .... " H.R.
Doc. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(c) (1947) (emphasis added); 1 LEGISLATV E HISTORY
179-80.
The Senate conferees refused to accept the House's proposals to regulate the reasonable-
ness of dues. Senator Taft disclaimed any intent to intrude into union financial affairs, finding
it "unwise to authorize an agency of the Government to undertake such elaborate policing of
the internal affairs of unions.... ." 93 CONG. REc. 6601 (1947); 2 LEGISLATiVE HISTORY
1540 (1948).
The Conference Committee's one concession to the House related to one-time initiation
fees, not dues. Exorbitant initiation fees are a barrier to membership and, selectively applied,
could allow a union to maintain a hiring monopoly of its friends. Compare 93 CONG. REc.
6659; 2 LEGISLATIrE HISTORY 1574 (Sen. Murray); 93 CONG. REc. 6673; 2 LEGISLATrVE
HISTORY 1589-1590 (Sen. Pepper) with 93 CONG. REc. 7001; 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1623
(Sen. Taft).
42. Perhaps the best evidence of this is that during the debates several legislators com-
plained that the dues-funded AFL and CIO were spending heavily to defeat the Taft-Hartley
Act itself. See 2 LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 41, at 1424, 1549; Cantor, Uses and
Abuses, supra note 2, at 74.
43. See Detroit Mailers Union No. 40, 192 N.L.R.B. 951, 951-52 (1971). It is important
to recall that the unions lost considerable power through this compromise. Because Taft-
Hartley outlawed the "closed shop" and substituted the union shop, unions could no longer
insist that only union members be hired. Furthermore, amended § 8(a)(3) ensures that no
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Finally, even the objections voiced in debate concerned only union poli-
ticking; the record apparently does not report any objection made to us-
ing dues for organizational drives.
The Railway Labor Act's union security provisions were modeled
after the NLRA's, and the legislative history of section 8(a)(3) was ex-
pressly invoked by sponsors of the RLA amendment.' During delibera-
tions, several witnesses complained that the bill set no limit on the scope
or amount of fees and dues that could be exacted. Witnesses also in-
formed Congress of the broad range of union activities beyond securing
collective bargaining agreements that require the financial support of
workers.45 Yet Congress again failed to enact limits on dues spending.
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley compromise and its 1951
replication in the union shop authorizations of the Railway Labor Act
presented a serious obstacle to later arguments that Congress had never-
theless implicitly limited unions' discretion in respect to use of dues."
Perhaps for that reason, the Court began to invoke the First Amendment
to justify inroads on union sovereignty over dues, even when it formally
attributed the result to the intent of Congress. In 1956, the Supreme
Court declined to find a union shop agreement by itself offensive to em-
ployees' first amendment freedoms of speech or association.47 But the
first time it heard a challenge to the use of union shop dues for political
activities, the Court perceived constitutional questions of "the utmost
gravity."" To avoid those questions, the Court construed the RLA to
mean that employees could not be compelled to pay union dues to pro-
mote pro-labor candidates or other "ideological" causes, even if those
causes were intended to produce workplace benefits for all employees.49
employee can be fired for nonmembership as long as she pays dues. Thus, unions lost control
over who would be employed and retained. They were left with only what they had always
possessed: the right to negotiate for full payment of dues from all covered workers. The com-
promise, Congress noted, insulated workers' jobs from potentially oppressive union power but
protected unions from the "free rider," who would benefit from representation without sharing
in its cost. See 1 LEGiXSLATrw HisroRY, supra note 41, 300, 871, 412-13; 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY at 952-53, 1010, 1170, 1199, 1417, 1419-20, 1422.
44. See supra note 36.
45. The legislative history is summarized in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S.
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 445-46 (1984); see Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct.
at 2665 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Shea, supra note 5, at 29-31.
46. Even the Court admitted, in Ellis, that a fair inference drawn from the RLA is that
Congress did not intend to limit expenditures. 466 U.S. at 445-46.
47. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); see Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977) (similar "agency shop" agreement covering public sector
employees does not offend first amendment).
48. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961).
49. Id at 749, 763-64, 768-69. The opinion attributes to Congress an intent to authorize
collection of union shop dues only insofar as necessary to avoid "free riding" by those who
[Vol. 15:603
THE COST OF "FEE SPEECH"
As extended, this construction now compels refunds to the dissenting
employee for any activity outside of core representational services, appar-
ently without regard to whether the challenging employee actually has
ideological disagreements with the challenged activity." The first
amendment-based inquiry into actual ideological affront has been aban-
doned. The net result is that first amendment concerns have propelled
the Court beyond what the Constitution requires.5
Cases arising under the NLRA followed a parallel course in the
lower federal courts culminating in the Supreme Court's recent opinion
in Communications Workers of America v. Beck. 2 Under both statutes,
limits on the union's authority to spend dues are said to arise implicitly
from Congress' blanket authorization to contract to collect them. In
Beck, a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that "[section] 8(a)(3),
like its statutory equivalent, § 2, Eleventh of the RLA, authorizes the
exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to 'performing the duties
of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the em-
ployer on labor-management issues'. ''1 3
would recieve the benefit of union service without paying for them. The Court's concept of
such "benefits" is narrow: "Section 2, Eleventh contemplated compulsory unionism to force
employees to share the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the
costs of the adjustment and settlement of disputes." Id. at 704. The union benefits Congress
had in mind may well have included political or organizational services as well as negotiations.
The division between collective bargaining and politics simply creates a new kind of free rider.
See infra notes 113-119 and accompanying text. At best, Congress was silent about its intent
in regard to the uses of union shop dues. See supra note 41.
50. In 1984 the Supreme Court iterated:
Mhe test [for requiring a refund] must be whether the challenged expenditures are
necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an
exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-man-
agement issues. Under this standard, objecting employees may be compelled to pay
their fair share of not only the direct cost of negotiating and administering a collec-
tive-bargaining contract and of settling grievances and disputes, but also the expenses
of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement or effec-
tuate the duties of the union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit.
Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2651
(1988) (adopting same formula as construction of NLRA).
51. See infra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
52. 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988). Street happened to arise under the RLA's union shop provi-
sions. The long stretch between invention of the fee speech doctrine under the RLA and its
application to the NLRA might be explained by the practice of routinely settling individual
claims, which are often for quite small amounts.
53. 108 S. Ct. at 2657 (quoting test from Ellis, see supra note 50). As applied by the trial
court below, this formula excluded about 80% of the union's annual budget, including all
politicking, lobbying for labor legislation, supporting sister unions, organizing, and publicity
for such "ideological" activities. Id. at 1210-12. The union accountant who testified in Beck I
compared the problem of making a proper allocation of staff worktime according to this
formula to "making a frog fly." 776 F.2d 1187, 1212 (4th Cir. 1985).
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There are limits to what a court can do in the name of statutory
construction before it becomes reconstruction.54 The Court's interpreta-
tion of the RLA and NLRA is extremely fragile.55 The sparseness of
statutory support for these outcomes demands a candid acknowledge-
ment that the results are compelled, if at all, only by the Constitution and
not by Congressional intent.56 Treating the rule openly as constitution-
ally based would require the Court to inquire more closely into the pre-
cise justification for protecting workers from supporting particular
expenditures. What the Constitution requires may be different for con-
ventional political expenditures than for the funding of new organizing."
54. See, e.g., Street, 367 U.S. 740, 784-85 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office, 363 U.S. 207, 213 (1960)):
I think the Court is once more 'carrying the doctine [sic] of avoiding constitutional
questions to a wholly unjustifiable extreme.' In fact, I think the Court is actually
rewriting § 2, Eleventh to make it mean exactly what Congress refused to make it
mean. The very legislative history relied on by the Court appears to me to prove that
its interpretation of § 2, Eleventh is without justification. For that history shows that
Congress with its eyes wide open passed that section, knowing that its broad lan-
guage would permit the use of union dues to advocate causes, doctrines, laws, candi-
dates and parties, whether individual members objected or not.
Black would have found the statute unconstitutional because it permitted compelled support of
ideas offensive to the payor.
Not surprisingly, a number of commentators do not find the Court's construction of the
RLA and its history persuasive. See, e.g., Cantor, Uses and.Abuses, supra note 2, at 72 (Justice
Brennan "tortured the legislative history"); Hyde, supra note 20, at 5 (statutory basis for ex-
clusion of politics not made clear by cases); Shea, supra note 5, at 29-31 (legislative history was
"twisted").
55. The troublesome statutory justification for the rule has provoked comment even from
justices now on the Court. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Rehnquist joined Justice
Stewart's opinion for the Court in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., in which Stewart wrote,
"Street embraced an interpretation of the Railway Labor Act not without its difficulties." 431
U.S. 207, 232 (1977) (citing Black, J. and Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Street, 367 U.S. 740,
784-86, 799-803).
56. Such an acknowledgement is important for the legislature as well as the adjudicative
process. For example, any Congressional amendment that expressly authorized use of dues for
political purposes would surely face a stiff first amendment challenge.
57. Another unanswered question is whether a regular, voluntary member of the union
can invoke the constitutional rule. As a common sense matter, a full member's rights against
the union might be governed only by contract law, in addition to whatever union rules the
membership has approved. Thus, the fee speech rules are commonly assumed to apply only in
favor of nonmembers or "financial core" members (see supra note 15). See TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-4, at 805 n.5 (2d ed. 1988) ("Presumably, membership being
voluntary, members were deemed to have consented to the expenditure."). Judicial solicitude
may also seem more appropriate for this group, since they are unable to participate democrati-
cally in collective union decisions about the use of union funds (even though they do so by
choice).
In fact, the Court does not always distinguish between the two groups' interests in how
their contributions are spent. In Ellis, the plaintiff classes included both involuntary agency fee
payors and regular members. The Court did not distinguish their rights in formulating or
applying its test. See Ellis, 466 U.S. 435, 439 n.2. In Abood, the leading public sector case,
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B. The First Amendment
L Governmental Action
Exploring a possible constitutional genesis for the union's duty in
spending dues paid by financial core members begins with a determina-
tion whether government action exists in union security agreements.
There has never been a formal finding that sufficient governmental in-
volvement exists in every private union shop agreement to make the First
Amendment directly applicable to dues spending. Yet this seems a fair
characterization of the view held by the current Court. Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education51 suggests that all private union shop agreements
involve state action. Although Abood is often distinguished as a public
sector case, the government's involvement as an employer and a party to
the union's agency shop contract was incidental. The Court invoked re-
lated private sector precedents to find state action in Michigan's legisla-
tivepermission to bargain for agency shops. The majority opinion stated:
[W]hile the actions of public employers surely constitute "state ac-
tion", the union shop, as authorized by the Railway Labor Act,
also was found to result from governmental action in Hanson. The
plaintiff's claims in Hanson failed, not because there was no gov-
ernmental action, but because there was no First Amendment vio-
lation [in agreeing to a union shop].59
where the test took a pure constitutional form, plaintiffs included union members who were
paying agency shop fees under protest, members who had joined the union and paid without
protest, and others who had refused to pay or join. Abood described the protected class
broadly as "government employees [not excluding voluntary members] who object" to political
spending. More recently the Court stated that it is the nonunion employee whose first amend-
ment rights are affected by political spending, Chicago Teachers Ass'n v. Hudson, 475 U.S.
292 (1986), but no full union members had joined that suit. Fourth Circuit Judge Murnaghan
who, by concurring in Beck II, cast the necessary sixth vote to find union liability, carefully
limited his rationale to the nonunion, involuntary fee payor, although the other five judges
supporting the judgment were not clear on that point. 800 F.2d 1287 & n. 10. Justice Bren-
nan's opinion, affirming the Fourth Circuit, characterized the beneficiaries of the doctrine as
"dues paying nonmember employees." Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2045.
Of course, voluntary members could formally resign from the union to take advantage of
the refunds made available by the rule. Economic theory predicts that a rational member
might follow this course, even if she agreed that the union should spend dues to promote
political causes. See infra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
58. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
59. Id. at 226-27. Hanson was an early decision in which the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of union shop contracts authorized by the Railway Labor Act. Hanson did not in-
volve a claim by employees that their union was using their dues for political purposes.
Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
Logically, the public status of the employer does not make political expenditures by the
public employees' union a government action. The employer is not involved in spending deci-
sions. Its involvement is limited to agreeing that the union can collect mandatory dues or fees,
and that act of agreement, according to Hanson and Abood, does not offend the First
Amendment.
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Although some justices had their doubts about applying the state
action portion of Abood to the private sector,60 Ellis, the leading private
sector case after Abood, essentially does so. Justice White's majority
opinion in Ellis begins by reaffirming the Court's belief that Congress did
not intend to authorize the use of union shop dues for undertakings be-
yond providing direct representational services to the bargaining unit. 61
Union conventions, social activities, and nonpolitical publications are au-
thorized by the RLA, while organizing and litigation not related to the
collective bargaining agreement are not.62 If the test were only statutory,
that would have been the end of the matter. Justice White, however,
devoted an additional section of his opinion to analyzing whether the
First Amendment bars compelled financial support for the three activi-
ties allowed by the RLA. He introduced it with the flat assertion that
[t]he First Amendment does limit the uses to which the union can
put funds obtained from dissenting employees .... The issue is
whether these expenses involved additional interference with the
First Amendment interests of objecting employees, and, if so,
whether they are nonetheless adequately supported by a govern-
mental interest.63
This language, coming so closely after the Supreme Court's major clarifi-
cations in 19821 , of the reach of state action theory into the conduct of
60. In a concurring opinion, three justices expressed a concern that "[i]f collective-bar-
gaining agreements were subjected to the same constitutional constraints as federal rules and
regulations, it would be difficult to find any stopping place in the constitutionalization of pri-
vate conduct. 431 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., Rehnquist, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring). The
concurring opinion quotes Professor Wellington, a long-time critic of extending the govern-
ment action doctrine to private labor unions:
Most private activity is infused with the governmental in much the way that the
union shop is .... Enacted and decisional law everywhere conditions and shapes the
nature of private arrangements in our society. This is true with the commercial con-
tract-regulated as it is by comprehensive uniform statutes-no less than with the
collective bargaining agreement ....
431 U.S. at 252 n.7, citing H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND LEGAL PROCEss, 244-45 (1968).
61. 466 U.S. at 447-448.
62. Id. at 448-453.
63. Id at 455, 457. Justice White cited Abood, 431 U.S. 209, for the proposition that the
First Amendment applied to union expenditures, but without distinguishing Abood as a public
sector case. His opinion concludes that requiring contributions to social hours, publications,
and conventions is constitutional because these activities are justified by the governmental in-
terest behind the union shop itself. Id. at 455-57. The employees' primary submission in the
case was that "the use of their fees to finance the challenged activities violated the First
Amendment." Id. at 444.
64. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-42 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). If in the
future the Court decided to retreat from Ellis, the 1982 cases would furnish powerful argu-
ments against finding government action in the NLRA union shop. The Court's current ap-
proach attributes otherwise private conduct to the government only after a two-part inquiry is
satisfied. First, "the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of a right or privilege created
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private actors, indicates that no retrenchment was intended in the appli-
cation of constitutional standards to these private contracts.65 The Court
prudently refused to reach the governmental action issue posed in Corn-*
munications Workers of America v. Beck involving NLRA-governed un-
ions,66 but said nothing to cast doubt on earlier findings of governmental
action in Ellis and other RLA cases.67 The only event that would now
force the Court to decide this issue would be a Congressional amendment
to either NLRA or RLA authorizing dues expenditures for purposes
(such as organizing) prohibited by the Ellis/Beck test. Assuming the
Court would then find governmental action, as it did in Ellis, it would
next have to apply a constitutional test to those expenditures.
2. The First Amendment Test
If judicially imposed limits on the use of union dues are sustainable
only as a matter of constitutional law, the putatively statutory formula
now applied in the private sector must capture precisely the sorts of
union undertakings that trigger first amendment concerns. Though the
by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. Only the
first of these, the exercise of a right or privilege, is even arguably present when the union
negotiates for a union shop, and it is not at all obvious that entering a contract can fairly be
characterized as a "right or privilege created by the state."
Second, "the party charged... must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor
... because [1] he is a state official, because [2] he... has obtained significant aid from state
officials, or because [3] his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State." Id. at 940. None of
these characterizations easily fits the union, acting alone or with the private employer, to en-
force a contract endorsed by federal legislation. The second choice---a private actor acting
with state officials or with their aid-is most plausible. But unions are only permitted, not
actively encouraged, to seek union security agreements. It is true that union security is a
"mandatory subject of bargaining," meaning that the employer cannot refuse to discuss it at
the table. NLRA § 8 (a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) (1982). But neither employer nor union is
obligated to agree to this or any other bargaining proposal. It is questionable whether the
requirement to discuss a security proposal in good faith produces more union security agree-
ments than would occur without the law. In this light, Congress' assistance does not appear
significant.
65. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question, several circuit courts have
found in the NLRA's toleration of union shop agreements sufficient government action to
invoke the federal constitution. See Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.
1970); see generally Reilly, The Constitutionality of Labor Unions' Collection and Use of Forced
Dues for Non-Bargaining Purposes, 32 MERCER L. Rv. 561, 563 (1981). These decisions
predated the Court's major pronouncements on the state action doctrine in 1982. See supra
note 64.
66. 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2656 (1988) (unnecessary to decide whether entering into union se-
curity contracts permitted, though not compelled, by § 8(a)(3) involves "state action").
The Court followed its past practice: it avoided the constitutional question by construing
the NLRA to provide as much (or more) protection as the First Amendment would require.
67. Id
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Court interprets the RLA to mean that organizing is nonchargeable, it
has never separately analyzed such expenditures under the First
Amendment.
The Ellis formula,6" if used as a proxy for constitutional analysis,
would stand constitutional theory on its head. The statutory test in-
quires whether a particular expenditure was authorized by a policy, at-
tributed to Congress, of requiring nonmember employee support only for
specific collective bargaining services rendered on behalf of the payor or
her unit. A constitutional analysis asks not whether a challenged expen-
diture is authorized, but whether it is prohibited. Moreover, the statu-
tory test has abandoned the requirement of ideological offense, which is a
prerequisite to a first amendment claim. Especially in light of the inhib-
iting effect of these legal restrictions on the union's free speech interests,
charging the costs of organizing new workers to union shop dues should
not be prohibited unless the constitution requires it.69
The best source for a pure statement of the Court's first amendment
philosophy in regard to use of compelled union dues is still Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education.70 In Abood, Michigan law had already been
interpreted by that state's highest court to permit a teachers' union to
spend agency shop fees for lobbying and support of political candidates.7'
Therefore, the employees' first amendment issue was cleanly presented
and decided.
Abood judged the agency shop contract between the school district
and the teachers' union to be constitutional, even though the Court ac-
knowledged that compelled support of any union function could offend
an employee's sincere political and moral beliefs.72 The Court held that
interference with associational beliefs was justified by the government's
judgment that requiring payment of fees to support the exclusive repre-
sentative makes an important contribution to labor relations.73 Exclusiv-
ity makes bargaining more efficient for the employer and maximizes
68. See supra note 50.
69. Union speech is also protected by the First Amendment, and the expenditure of funds
to further an individual's expression is generally held to be a constitutional interest. See Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
70. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
71. Id. at 230.
72. Id. at 222.
73. Under the principle of "exclusive representation," once a union is elected by a major-
ity of the bargaining unit, that union has the exclusive power (and the duty) to represent all
employees in the unit. Employees who voted against the union, or who oppose any union, are
not free to decline representation or to seek separate representation. Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). The union is obliged to represent all
fairly. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
employee leverage by concentrating it in one agent. Agency shops ensure
that all employees benefited by the union's representation will share
equally in its costs, reducing resentment and divisiveness and increasing
the stability of the exclusive agent. In sum, the government has an im-
portant interest74 in preventing "free riding" even by conscientious
objectors.
The union's political causes could not, however, constitutionally be
funded from the dues of dissenting employees. These expenditures lost
the shield of "government interest" because, in the Court's view, they
were not "germane" to collective bargaining; political expenditures were
not undertaken "to promote the cause which justified bringing the group
together."7 Building on constitutional principles that prohibit the gov-
ernment from compelling an individual to affirm any belief, the Court
found that forced contribution to objectionable causes would violate free-
dom of speech.76
The Court thus found state action implicit in the contract and up-
held the constitutionality of compelled dues in the public sector, but ac-
cepted plaintiffs' arguments that some uses of employee funds violate first
amendment rules against government-compelled beliefs. As for the lat-
ter, plaintiffs specifically objected to the union spending dues to "contrib-
ute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its
duties as exclusive bargaining representative."77
The Court's holding in Abood is limited to the proposition that
plaintiffs allegations stated a cause of action. What constitutes a valid
use of dues from nonmembers remains ambiguous. The majority drew
74. The Court did not, in Abood, require that the government interest be "compelling" or
"overriding," a relaxation that prompted criticism from Justice Powell: "Before today it had
been well established that when state law intrudes upon protected speech, the State itself must
shoulder the burden of proving that its action is justified by overriding state interests... The
Court, for the first time in a First Amendment case, simply reverses this principle." 431 U.S. at
244, 263.
75. 1.d at 223.
76. The Court relied on this famous passage from West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943):
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
Compelling monetary contributions to underwrite objectionable beliefs is several steps
removed from compelling the objector to express the belief, which was the situation of the
West Virginia schoolchildren coerced into reciting the flag salute. The gap was partly filled by
the Court's opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), when it found that
government restrictions on a candidate's campaign expenditures interfere with free expression.
In the Abood Court's viewforced political spending similarly infringes freedom of speech. 431
U.S. at 234.
77. Id.
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the line somewhere between a union's "collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance-adjustment" activity, for which financial
compulsion is clearly permitted,7" and advancement of political views,
political candidates, and other ideological causes "not germane to" or
"unrelated to collective bargaining,"79 for which compulsion is unconsti-
tutional. The opinion did not attempt to identify what sorts of expendi-
tures would be deemed "unrelated to collective bargaining."
Expenditures for organizing were not an issue in Abood, and the Supreme
Court has never held that such expenditures violate the First
Amendment. °
3. Some Objections to the Dichotomy
The Court's reasoning in Abood has been criticized by constitutional
scholars on two grounds. First, the rule equates compelled financial sup-
port with compelled speech or belief-a large extension of West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette.1 Second, the line dividing permissible
78. Id at 232.
79. Id at 235-36.
80. Two subsequent public sector cases relied on the First Amendment to disallow ex-
penditures to promote union strength beyond the bargaining unit. Cumero v. PERB, 166 Cal.
App. 3d 952, 213 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1985), rev. granted, 701 P.2d 1170, 215 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1985)
(employee in disagreement with goals of union cannot be compelled to lend involuntary sup-
port to its growth); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 556 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (loan
to affiliated union to support its strike cannot be charged to dissenting nonmembers). In the
private sector, use of dues to organize was held nonchargeable under the RLA, see Ellis, 466
U.S. at 435, and Beck affirmed the lower court's disallowance of organizing expenses under the
NLRA without addressing organizing specifically in the opinion. 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988), af'g
800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986). Some earlier NLRA cases were contra. See Associated Build-
ers & Contractors v. Carpenters Vacation and Holiday Trust Fund, 700 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir.
1983) (money spent on organizing to eliminate competition from nonunion employers was
germane to bargaining and therefore chargeable for purposes of first amendment analysis);
Price v. UAW, 795 F.2d 1128, 1135 (2d Cir. 1986) (organizing was "normal and reasonable"
union expense), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2680 (1988).
Several courts have extended the rule of Abood to integrated bar associations that spend
mandatory dues on political activities. See, eg., Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564 (11th
Cir. 1986); Keller v. State Bar, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1196, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1986), rev. granted,
Aug. 28, 1986 (disallowing expenditures for lobbying, amicus briefs, bar conventions address-
ing political questions, and public education campaigns supporting retention of Supreme Court
Justices); Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458 (D.N.M. 1982) (disallowing bar association's lobby-
ing expenses on bills affecting continuing legal education, licensing requirements, criminal pro-
cedure rules, hourly rates for public defenders, Uniform Child Custody Act, and other bills
relating to practice of law); Falk v. State Bar, 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981) (all
lobbying by bar association infringes objecting members' first amendment rights).
81. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Professor Shiffrin writes:
The Court held [in Abood] that such compelled contributions unreasonably invade
the individual's freedom "to believe as he will" and invoked Barnette's "fixed star in
our constitutional constellation." The link between compelled contributions and
freedom of belief or expression, however, is tenuous. And the invalidation of com-
and impermissible financial compulsion is not logically justifiable.8 2 La-
bor law commentators criticize the practical effect of distinguishing be-
tween collective bargaining and political activity. They assert that the
rule does not take into account the union's need to resort to the political
process to secure immediate, employment-related economic benefits.8 3
The immediate benefit to represented workers is most plain when the
AFL-CIO lobbies Congress or state legislatures for supplements to col-
lective bargaining contracts, such as pension protection, workers' com-
pelled contributions is surely a long step from Barnette, where the state sought to
compel individuals publicly to profess beliefs they did not share.... Requiring indi-
viduals to make contributions to a union, which in turn spends a portion for political
purposes, does not compel them to believe anything or to express anything, nor does
it prohibit them from believing or expressing anything.... It is true that because
some of their income has been taken, fewer funds are available for political expres-
sion, but this could be said of any compelled financial contribution, from social secur-
ity, to the income tax, to funds for the collective bargaining process itself.
Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 590-91 (1980) (footnotes omitted). See
supra note 76.
82. See Shiffrin, supra note 81, at 591: "The Court's failure to justify a distinction be-
tween compelled contributions to the union's collective bargaining process and compelled con-
tributions to the union's [political] election efforts fatally compromises its reasoning."
The criticism is a powerful one, but it is not the primary subject of this Article. The
discussion which follows assumes generally a constitutionally based dichotomy between
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses, but argues that it fails to account for disallowance of
organizing expenses.
83. Eg., Cantor, Forced Payments, supra note 20, at 40. Political advocacy of employee
interests is especially important in subject areas where unions are relatively powerless, such as
in plant shutdowns. Recent changes in NLRB rulings have severely limited unions' ability to
contract for protection against sudden plant closures, leaving the unemployed and soon-to-be-
unemployed only the hope of state and federal legislation. See Otis Elevator Co. (United Tech-
nologies), 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984); Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268
N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), enforced sub nom. International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Barron, The Causes and Impact of Plant Shutdowns and Relocations
and Potential Non-NLRA Responses, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1389, 1401 (1984) (describing proposed
statutes providing for severance pay, government assistance, and advance notice to employees
and communities).
Some courts, even after Abood, find lobbying by public sector unions to be a chargeable
expense when it is directed to obtaining employment benefits. The reason often given is that
many of the terms of employment bargained for bilaterally in the private sector are governed
by law for public employees. See, e.g., Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1984).
Robinson upheld a New Jersey statute that allowed public sector unions to charge against
representation fees the "costs of lobbying activities designed to foster policy goals in collective
negotiations and contract administration or to secure for the employees represented advan-
tages in wages, hours, and other conditions of employment in addition to those secured
through collective negotiations with the public employer." N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.5; Robinson, 741
F.2d at 609. When such matters as class size, licensing requirements, length of school year,
and dismissal procedures for school teachers are legislated and thus removed from the union's
power to negotiate them, lobbying is a logical adjunct to bargaining. See Cumero v. PERB,
166 Cal. App. 3d 952, 213 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1985), rev. granted July 11, 1985. State appropria-
tions to local school districts, supplemented by local elections, also would involve the teachers'
union in political efforts with direct economic consequences.
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pensation, or occupational health and safety rules." Contribution to a
candidate is the most controversial type of union expense and the one
most consistently disallowed by courts.8 5 Yet few political events are
more significant to labor's economic well-being than the election of a pro-
labor governor or president. 6
The Supreme Court has firmly rejected arguments that union polit-
ical activities are germane to its representation function, despite the pleas
of dissenting justices, 7 labor leaders," and scholars 9 that political advo-
cacy benefits workers. While it has not explicitly ruled that the Constitu-
tion requires organizational expenses to be treated in the same manner as
84. When unions attempt to obtain through legislation improvements in "wages, hours,
and working conditions," which the union has the right to negotiate with the employer, 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1982), they seek benefits that they might have obtained at the
bargaining table. The Court's position that freedom of belief is violated by compelled support
for this type of speech cannot be explained by the subject matter of the speech. A possible
explanation is that the Court believes the public manner of the speech, and its nonworker
audience, create the infringement. When a union is engaged in the "pursuit of economic ends
through political means," it must be the means, not the ends, that offend belief. See Hyde,
Beyond Collective Bargaining: The Politicization of Labor Relations Under Government Con-
tract, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1, 32.
85. See, eg., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 744 (1961) (financ-
ing of campaigns for federal and state offices).
86. The Chief Executive is not only in a position to propose or to veto pro-worker legisla-
tion, but also wields a great deal of control over appointments to courts and labor boards.
Consequently, labor organizations and employers attach great importance to electing sympa-
thetic senators, whose advice and consent are necessary for an appointment to the NLRB. The
members of the NLRB are appointed by the President, with the advice of the Senate, to serve
for five-year terms. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). Any member of the Board may be removed by
the President for "neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause." Id.
Changes in union, employee, and employer rights that follow the shifting political makeup
of the NLRB have been much publicized. Many scholars agreed, on the occasion of the law's
50th anniversary, that the Reagan Board has fundamentally reworked portions of the law to
cut back on protections unions and workers had long enjoyed under previous boards. Others
admit that the changes have been significant, but find them an improvement. See Symposium.
The National Labor Relations Act After 50 Years, 38 STAN. L. REV. 937-1140 (1986).
87. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Street, stated:
The notion that economic and political concerns are separable is pre-Victorian. Pres-
idents of the United States and Committees of Congress invite views of labor on
matters not immediately concerned with wages, hours, and conditions of employ-
ment. And this Court accepts briefs as amici from the AFL-CIO on issues that can-
not be called industrial, in any circumscribed sense. It is not true in life that political
protection is irrelevant to, and insulated from, economic interests. It is not true for
industry or finance. Neither is it true for labor.
367 U.S. at 814-15 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
88. Joseph Rauh, a much-honored labor lawyer, argued in 1961:
From the first, there has been no line of demarcation between the bargaining, educa-
tion and political activities of unions. There is a tradition of over one hundred years
of union political activity in this country. As the federal government has increasingly
legislated in the field of union activity and on economic matters which are of the
most immediate concern to laboring men as workers and as union members, the
necessity for labor union political activity has correspondingly increased.
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political ones, the Court rejected arguments that a larger and stronger
union significantly benefits the already represented worker, when it disal-
lowed organizing costs in Ellis.90
I. Which Side of the Constitutional Line for Organizing?
A. Distinguishing Organizing from Politicking
The ability freely to fund new organizing may be more crucial to
unions than full funding of publications or lobbying. Other interest
groups are likely to continue to support pro-worker laws even if labor's
financial resources for lobbying and candidate contributions are limited
by law. But the disallowance of expenses necessary for recruiting new
members places in doubt the value and continued existence of the union
movement. Without organizing, there is no labor movement.91
Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 152, 163 (1961).
Pockets of the labor movement were distinctly opposed to involvement with politics and
political parties. The Industrial Workers of the World (nicknamed the Wobblies) believed that
self-organization in places of production was the only way to advance the working class; until
such collective power was a reality, politics would be divisive, untrustworthy and conservatiz-
ing. Vincent St. John exhorted his fellow Wobblies in about 1910 with the following remarks:
[W]hile the workers are divided on the industrial field it is not possible to unite them
on any other field to advance a working class program .... It is impossible for
anyone to be a part of the capitalist state and to use the machinery of the state in the
interest of the workers.... To those who think the workers will have to be united in
a political party, we say dig in and do so, but do not try to use the economic organi-
zation to further the aims of the political party.
St. John, Political Parties and the I. W. W., in THEORIES OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVE-
MENT 75 (S. Larson and B. Nissen, eds., 1987) [hereinafter LARSON & NISSEN]. The Wob-
blies, though they had many adherents in the mines, mills, and logging camps of the West
before World War I, were never a mainstream movement. Their numbers were decimated by
red-scare prosecutions, censorship, and violent attacks, including lynchings. They were not a
serious force after the 1920s. Cox, Box, & GORMAN, LABOR LAW 11 (10th ed., 1986).
89. Archibald Cox, one of the most influential labor scholars of this century, wrote:
It is difficult, if not impossible to separate the economic and political functions of
labor unions. Right-to-work-laws affect union organization and collective bargain-
ing. Legislation subjecting unions to the anti-trust laws or confining their scope to
the employees of a single company would greatly weaken their bargaining, if it did
not destroy them altogether.... The basic philosophy of a President and his party
affects appointments to agencies like the National Labor Relations Board, which in
turn exert tremendous influence upon the course of labor relations. Even the tariff
impinges on labor negotiations. The bargaining power of the Hatters Union, for ex-
ample, is affected by the competition of low-cost foreign goods.
A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 107 (1960). See also Woll, Unions in
Politics: 4 Study in Law and the Worker's Needs, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 130, 142 (1961).
90. 466 U.S. at 452. Cf. Assorted Builders & Contractors v. Carpenters Vacation & Holi-
day Trust Fund, 700 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1983) (money spent on organizing to eliminate com-
petition from nonunion employers .was germane to bargaining and therefore not a "political"
expenditure for purposes of first amendment analysis).
91. Henkel & Wood, supra note 1, at 744 (quoting from a speech given by an AFL-CIO
official in 1977). Organizing is necessary for maintaining current union strength as well as
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Constitutionally, the case against charging organizing expenses
seems much weaker than the case against lobbying or candidate promo-
tion. The degree of claimed infringement of speech or association
rights92 should first be measured against the reasons for the general rule
prohibiting government compulsion of distasteful ideological expression.
Foremost among these reasons is that an individual has a right not to be
personally and publicly associated with an objectionable governmental
message.93 Forced expression results when a regulation requires an indi-
vidual to assist in disseminating a message, under circumstances in which
outsiders might wrongly attribute the belief to the individual.94 Outside
the labor context, these circumstances generally have required a public
affirmation or association.9"
Unconstitutional public affirmation was first found in forced public
recitation of the government's quintessential political message, the flag
salute.96 Building upon the theme of public attribution, two modem
cases have begun to describe the contours of the right to dissociate one-
self from an ideological message. 97 Wooley v. Maynard98 identified a first
amendment right to avoid becoming a public "courier" for the state's
ideological message, at least when less drastic means would achieve the
state's countervailing interests.9 9 On the other hand, Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins "00 rejected a similar argument against the forced
use of private property, a shopping center, to support the expressive ac-
tivity of others. First, the views expressed by members of the public
expanding it. Labor economists estimate that because of attrition and other factors, the union
share of the work force in the United States tends to decline by three percent a year, in the
absence of new organization through NLRB elections. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note
8, at 222.
92. The degree of infringement is relevant to assessing the state's countervailing interest in
regulation. Cf. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 310 (White,
J., dissenting) (when an infringement is "slight and ephemeral," the state's interest justifying
the regulation need not be as high).
93. See generally Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
94. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
95. Id
96. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
97. Wooley, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (sustaining the right); Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (rejecting such a claim).
98. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
99. Id. at 715, 716. In Wooley, the Court held that the state of New Hampshire could not
require motorists, over their religious and political objections, to display the state motto "Live
Free or Die" on their car license plates.
100. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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would not likely be identified with the owner.1"1 Second, unlike that in
Wooley, the message in Pruneyard was not dictated by the state, and
there was no danger of governmental discrimination against or for a par-
ticular message. The property owners could also dissociate themselves
from any message by posting disclaimers. Barnette was dismissed as in-
apposite because there the speaker was compelled to communicate per-
sonally the government's message. These cases suggest that the Court
should look to the degree of coercion and the danger of public attribution
in measuring the degree of infringement posed by unconstitutional ex-
penditures for organizing.
The situation of a worker's desiring to distance herself from her
union's recruiting messages falls on the Pruneyard, rather than the
Wooley side of the line. Unlike the coercion exerted when a child is re-
quired to salute the flag, as in Barnette, when a union representative
speaks, no dissenting worker is asked to affirm or communicate publicly
any belief. Unlike the slogan on the license plate in Wooley, a union
message has not been prescribed by the government and required to be
displayed on one's personal property. If there is a danger of public attri-
bution of union views to dissenting workers, it is because the union might
be perceived as a representative of individual views. But union organiza-
tional drives, which usually take place outside of the dues payor's work-
place, are both more physically distant from the individual and less in the
public eye than the license plate slogan at issue in Wooley. Additionally,
when the medium used to disseminate the message is fungible and anony-
mous, as money is, rather than personal, as is one's car, there is less
danger of a public presumption of individual endorsement. The promo-
tion of unionism as an idea is unlikely to be associated by either the pub-
lie or the unorganized worker with particular represented employees.
Organizing is "what unions do"; it is thus more likely to be perceived as
a self-promoting institutional message than as the ideology of workers
whose dues pay its costs. In addition, union organizing drives are nor-
mally undertaken with the participation of unorganized workers, further
diluting the connection to represented workers.
To the extent that Abood condemns funding politics out of the dues
of objectors, it is arguably out of line with the teaching of Wooley and
Pruneyard that only public association with a message works a constitu-
101. Ma at 87. In Pruneyard, a shopping center owner was obligated by California law to
give members of the public access to the center in order to solicit signatures on a political
petition. The center's owners argued that the state had required them to participate in the
dissemination of an ideological message, contrary to Wooley. The Court disagreed, pointing
out that in Wooley the government itself prescribed the message and required it to be displayed
publicly as part of the car owner's daily life. 447 U.S. at 87.
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tional injury. 10 2 Even so, it would make more sense for Abood to limit a
union's political expenditures than to limit its organizing expenditures.
Political advocacy, to be effective, must be public. Large campaign con-
tributions are a matter of public record, as are media appeals, appear-
ances at legislative hearings, and candidate endorsements. The
individual worker in a union shop, whether or not a formal union mem-
ber, is still an "auto worker" or a "retail clerk" in the eyes of the public
and is not well situated to post disclaimers when the UAW or the Retail
Clerks Union takes a public position on a political issue. Politicking also
addresses the conduct of government, a subject of intense media and pub-
lic interest. On the other hand, organizing primarily addresses the eco-
nomic interests of workers in the workplace. While organizing is not
conducted in secrecy, the differences in both the degree and the nature of
the dissemination so attenuates the risk of public association as to merit a
difference in treatment between fees used for organizing and fees used for
politics.
An alternative view of the constitutional concerns behind Abood is
that the first amendment injury occurs simply because the employee is
compelled to "foster" a distasteful cause, even when there is no danger
that the union's views will be attributed to the contributor.10 Assu10-
102. Professor Cantor makes this argument in connection with political expenditures.
Forced Payments, supra note 20, at 19. See PG&E v. PUC, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (invalidating
agency rule that utility must allow its billing envelopes to be used to carry statements by
groups opposing utility's political messages).
103. Wooley, though it involved forced public association, also alluded to a right not to
foster objectionable ideas by being made an instrument for spreading them. 430 U.S. at 715.
As commentators have noted, this species of moral affront has never been held to entitle tax-
payers to withhold financial support from ideologically repugnant government programs,
speech, or conduct. Cantor, Forced Payments, supra note 20, at 21; Shiffrin, supra note 81, at
593. Indeed, Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun, dissenting in Wooley, rejected this theory,
pointing out that the Maynards could clearly have been forced to pay state taxes toward the
cost of erecting "Live Free or Die" billboards. 430 U.S. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The fiscal chaos resulting from such a rule would render administration of government a
nightmare. The taxpayer model provides a near analogy for arguing that union spending
should be similarly treated. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. At least for union
political expenditures, this view has not been accepted by the Supreme Court. Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Abood flatly rejects the analogy:
Compelled support of a private association is fundamentally different from compelled
support of government. Clearly, a local school board does not need to demonstrate a
compelling state interest every time it spends a taxpayer's money in ways which the
taxpayer finds abhorrent. The reason for permitting the Government to compel the
payment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is that the Govern-
ment is representative of the people. The same cannot be said of a union, which is
representative of only one segment of the population, with certain common interests.
431 U.S. at 259 n.13.
This language creates an impression of trying to have it both ways. The union is still
called a "private association," but the Court held in Abood that the union engaged in "state
ing this view to be correct, there are still reasons to treat compelled fund-
ing of organizing as inoffensive-reasons that relate to the ideological
content of organizing.
In contrast to campaign contributions, the union, by seeking new
members, is not asking the dissenters to support any "ideology" that the
union does not have the right to ask of them already. By hypothesis,
they are lawfully bound by a union shop agreement to be union "mem-
bers," at least financially. The most that a union can accomplish by way
of promoting unionism by winning an election at another workplace is to
negotiate another union shop agreement there. The union can require no
more of new workers than it can of the dissenting represented workers,
although its election propaganda will surely seek to promote the benefits
of full membership as well. The cost of promoting unionism as an ideol-
ogy through union propaganda aimed at achieving an election victory is
incremental. The real promotional power lies in the ability to negotiate
for a collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, an employee's contri-
bution to organizing "does not increase the infringement of his First
Amendment rights already resulting from the compelled contribution to
the union,"'" a justification already accepted by the Court.1 0 5
The ideological content of lobbying and campaigning is different
from that of organizing, even when the goal of the campaign is obtaining
worker benefits. Neither the intended audience nor the ultimate benefi-
ciaries of politicking can be confined to employees or their representa-
tives. The election of a pro-labor candidate has ramifications for many
issues unrelated to labor. For instance, welfare legislation confers bene-
fits on the general public as well as on employees. 10 6 In contrast, the
distinguishing characteristic of organizing speech is that it is speech by
workers to workers and for workers. Both intuitively and analytically,
action" when it collected and spent employee funds. If the union is equivalent to an arm of
government so as to be bound by the Constitution, there should be a better explanation why it
.s not treated like the government in its collective taxing and spending policies. Part of the
explanation may be the Court's belief that a union that elects to press workers' interests
through the political system is acting beyond the traditional role deemed appropriate for a
union, almost as if it were a local government that had "exceeded its powers." See infra text
accompanying notes 121-25.
104. Ellis, 466 U.S. 456 (1984).
105. In its original context, Justice White used this language to reject a first amendment
challenge to paying for union social hours. Id
106. Gaebler, Union Political Activity or Collective Bargaining? First Amendment Limita-
tions on the Uses of Union Shop Funds, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. Rv. 591, 608 (1981). Professor
Gaebler proposes a balancing test to decide whether political activity with both labor and
nonlabor effects offends the First Amendment. Id at 607-09. The problem with this approach
is that, while judges and legislatures are conversant with balancing tests, union accountants are
not. Balancing does not state a rule that regulated parties can easily administer.
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organizing speech is far more "germane to collective bargaining" 107 than
political advocacy.
The Court has consistently held that an employee can constitution-
ally be charged, even over her objection, for the cost of her union's activi-
ties that are "germane to collective bargaining." This is true despite the
Court's concession that collective bargaining may be ideologically offen-
sive to some, and thus may implicate speech or associational interests.1 "'
In ideological content, promotion of collective bargaining through re-
cruitment of new members is not clearly distinguishable from promotion
of collective bargaining "at home." Organizing the unorganized is not
only germane to collective bargaining-it is collective bargaining, or at
least a necessary prerequisite for it. Union organization is no more con-
stitutionally objectionable a cause than collective bargaining, for which
the Court has condoned union expenditures.
Thus, in contrast to political expenditures, the first amendment ob-
jection to the funding of election drives cannot be that the public will
wrongly attribute a pro-union attitude to the employee, nor that the em-
ployee is privileged to withhold financial support because of the
message's nonlabor content, audience, or beneficiaries. One last objec-
tion exists, however. The difference between new organizing and the in-
house collective bargaining sanctioned by Abood is that organizing drives
result in the spending of unit members' resources on outsiders. The ques-
tion is whether this is necessarily a distinction of constitutional magni-
tude. The rule applied in Ellis suggests that the Court believes it is. In
essence, Ellis tolerates infringements for which it judges the protesting
employee will be "compensated" in the form of measurable benefits. The
Court has stated that the promised benefits to the individual of increasing
union strength are too remote to create a significant "free rider" prob-
lem.109 It is at this point that the unduly narrow focus on the interests of
the individual leads the Court to an error subordinating the collective
interests of the group. Organizing does in fact benefit the already-repre-
sented as a group.10
107. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238, quoted with approval in Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456.
108. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
109. In Ellis the Court observed, "Organizing money is spent on people who are not union
members, and only in the most distant way works to the benefit of those already paying dues."
466 U.S. at 453.
110. Some fairly simple economic considerations indicate that a large union is more likely
to achieve benefits for represented workers than a small one. See generally M. OLsoN, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTrVE CHOICE 67-68 (1965).
First, a union is better off organizing an entire industry in order not to disadvantage the
organized employer. When an industry is competitive, the isolated unionized employer is less
able to pay his workers union scale wages and benefits and may even fail to survive competi-
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To place upon the union the impossible burden of demonstrating a
benefit to any particular individual at any particular moment in time mis-
conceives the nature of the benefits which flow from a long-range, collec-
tive strategy of increasing union strength. A rule that permits
individuals to opt out of financing the group effort here creates a free
rider problem that is less obvious, but still real. In fact, economic theory
predicts that the more remote and diffuse a collective benefit is, the less
likely it will be achieved without a uniform contribution rule. This the-
ory, which is taken up in the next section, is an elaboration of the free
rider justification for the agency shop accepted in Abood. It suggests
that, beyond dissenters, even persons who approve of their union's orga-
nizational efforts would rationally refuse to fund them in the absence of a
uniform contribution rule.
B. Why Free Individuals Vote For Group Coercion
Unions enjoy first amendment rights to engage in most communica-
tive activities: the fee speech doctrine does not prohibit them from or-
ganizing, lobbying or publishing on any subject-only from using
tion by his nonunion rivals. Even Chief Justice Taft, remembered as a proponent of the hated
labor injunction, acknowledged the economic necessity of organization:
To render [a labor union] at all effective, employees must make their combination
extend beyond one shop. It is helpful to have as many as may be in the same trade in
the same community united, because in the competition between employers they are
bound to be affected by the standard of wages of their trade in the neighborhood.
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921). As an
example, pressure to keep union wages low is common in the garment industry and in the
construction trades, where the use of nonunion labor affects competitive bidding. See, e.g.,
Associated Bldg. Contractors v. Carpenters Vacation & Holiday Trust Fund, 700 F.2d 1269
(9th Cir. 1983) (organizing to reduce competition chargeable to dissenters).
Second, a nonunion firm is a potential supplier of strike replacement workers, although
this consideration is less important when the struck jobs are unskilled and unemployment is
high. Third, organizational efforts among the general public might reduce the number of un-
employed willing to serve as strike breakers, thus strengthening the leverage of the represented
worker considering a strike. Fourth, a national union is advantageous to a mobile workforce,
creating a sense of community as well as employment access in new locations. Finally, the
political strength of a large union or a federated union movement can achieve work-related
gains through legislation or sympathetic appointments to policy making positions. Some stud-
ies tend to show that the likelihood that a member of Congress will vote for a labor-endorsed
bill increases in direct proportion to union density in the member's electoral district. For
example, from 1947 to 1982 the figures suggest that the percentage of pro-union bills actually
passed-58%-would have risen to 65% with a 5% increase in unionization. IL FREEMAN &
J. MEDOFF, supra note 8, at 193-200. The statistics do not necessarily mean that increases in
unionization would actually alter the success rates of bills proposed in Congress. Rather, Free-
man and Medoff caution that the more likely scenario is that provisions of bills favored or
opposed by the AFL-CIO would have been altered, with "pro-union" bills watered down when
unionism is weaker and strengthened when it is stronger. Id. at 198.
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nonmember employees' fees for those purposes."' The doctrine simply
requires that most such activities be funded from voluntary contribu-
tions. Thus, it might be argued that application of the rule to organizing
will not inevitably hinder expansion because union members who agree
with the goals of the organizers will act in their rational self-interest to
subsidize union growth voluntarily.
This common sense prediction of worker behavior may be incorrect.
According to a theory of group behavior advanced by economist and
professor Mancur Olson," 2 rational, self-interested members of large
groups will not voluntarily act to achieve their common interest. Ac-
cording to Olson, rational individuals will act to further a group goal
only when there is coercion or some other special incentive to make them
act in their common interest, even when those individuals believe firmly
that they would benefit from accomplishment of the group's goal.
111. See, ag., Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Abood:
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expression
of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of
other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representa-
tive. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from
charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing
those ideas.
431 U.S. at 235-236. Characterization of organizational speech as "economic" rather than
political would not make it any less protected by the First Amendment: "Our cases have never
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, or ethical matters-to
take a nonexhaustive list of labels--is not entitled to full First Amendment protection." Id at-
231.
112. The following description of this theory, as it applies to large groups generally and
matidatory union membership in particular, paraphrases M. OLSON, THE LoGIc oF COLLEC-
TE ACTION (1965). One objection to this theory is that attitudes in organizations are not
determined solely by the hope of gain. An emotional, political, moral, or ideological motive
can supply the incentive to promote a group goal, even when payment is not economically
rational. Olson counters this objection by pointing out that nation-states find it impossible to
function without coerced financial support in the form of taxes despite the obvious benefits of
government to individual citizens and the powerful ideology of nationalism and patriotism,
which should dictate voluntary support. The state cannot survive on voluntary payments,
because the services provided by government are collective benefits, public goods that cannot
feasibly be withheld from any member on the ground that she has not contributed to their cost.
National defense is the most obvious example.
Olson concedes that the tendency to indulge in "free riding" is countered by social pres-
sures when the group is small enough to permit face-to-face contact among the members.
Social status and social acceptance are individual, noncollective goods, so it is predictable that
they would serve as motivators even for economically irrational behavior. Id at 61-62.
Though it is not clear how small the group must be (in 1982, the average local union had 200
members, id at 34), peer pressure could be a powerful incentive in some unionized groups. Its
force would depend not only on the size of the group, but on the strength of union feeling in
the group, the willingness to ostracize noncontributors, and the degree to which contributors
cared.
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This seeming paradox arises from the nature of organizations' goals.
Groups are generally formed in order to pursue a good that is a collective
benefit. If a benefit could be as easily and effectively achieved by individ-
uals acting alone, the group would not be needed. Collective benefits,
called "public goods," confer the same benefit on all members of the
group without regard to individual contributions. Clean air and clean
water, for example, are collective goods, as are public radio and public
television. As Olson explains:
Though all of the members of the groups therefore have a common
interest in obtaining this collective benefit, they have no common
interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good. Each
would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily
would get any benefit provided whether he had borne part of the
cost or not.
1 13
A rational group member will not make a financial sacrifice to further a
group goal because her contribution will not perceptibly improve her op-
portunity to receive the hoped-for benefit. In fact, the individual who
withholds payment increases her chances of receiving something for
nothing. Thus, non-support is the most logical choice for each individual
in a large group, even though the goal will not be achieved if all members
withhold. Since all members will be tempted to act this way if possible,
even democratic groups create rules that require (coerce) support from
all members equally. Only the consequences of breaking the rule provide
the incentive needed for the rational person to conform.
This theory explains why union members overwhelmingly vote to
approve union security devices that compel union membership or finan-
cial support. Without some form of compulsion, nonmember employees
would receive collective benefits without paying for them. Accordingly,
although each individual would advance her self-interest by staying free,
a group of such individuals will freely vote to bind themselves and each
other to a scheme that coerces uniform financial obligations. 114 Olson
concludes that, despite the obvious connection between ideology and or-
ganization, large national unions could not exist with real strength and
durability without some type of compulsory membership. 115
113. !d at 21.
114. As Olson points out, NLRB supervised elections demonstrate that unionized workers
support union security. He cites the example of the special union shop elections required by
Congress after the Taft-Hartley Act. These elections required the affirmative vote of a major-
ity of those eligible to vote, an unusually strict standard, to authorize union shop provisions.
Contrary to the assumptions of the Act's sponsors, workers did not choose to escape from
compulsory membership. After the unions won 97% of such elections in the Act's first four
years, Congress deleted the requirement. Id. at 85.
115. Id at 88.
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Since increasing the percentage of the unionized workforce through
organization is a collective benefit, the unconstrained, rational worker
would refuse to contribute to that goal. Withholding dues support for
any union activity within the embrace of the fee speech refund rule could
not be interpreted as disagreement or disinterest, but action out of ra-
tional self-interest. 116 A refund rule for individuals would interfere with
the preference of the majority of employees to bind themselves, as well as
dissenting employees, to a uniform rule.' 1 7
The possibility that collective benefit does result from enforcing the
majority's preference for a uniform rule is too strong to be ignored. A
court must make a choice about when it is appropriate to honor the
desires of individuals by overriding, or at least undermining, the collec-
tive desires of the group."" While this tension exists in all rules concern-
ing union shop dues, it is presented most starkly in the context of
116. One important qualification should be noted. If an employee must allege or prove a
sincere ideological objection to take advantage of the rule, the effect will be diminished because
honest pro-union employees will not be able to act in their economic self-interest by escaping
the obligation. Theoretically, ideological upset is a prerequisite to a constitutionally based
claim. If, on the other hand, the rule were phrased, as it now is to disallow "unrelated" or-
ganizing expenses irrespective of ideological objection, the effect could be to induce even pro-
union employees to withdraw dues support for these activities.
117. The effect of this phenomenon should not be exaggerated. Not all employees will
choose to become free riders just because the option is there. Figures from litigation indicate
that so far the numbers of employees seeking refunds is not high. Comment, Mandatory Union
Fees, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. Rnv. 555, 570 n.58 (1985). Litigated cases, however, probably form a
poor sample, and the Supreme Court only expanded the rule to NLRA governed unions-the
overwhelming majority-in its 1988 Beck opinion. A low incidence of refund requests could
be explained in a number of ways: (1) the available refund is small or zero because the union is
complying with fee speech rules by reducing dues in advance; (2) the amounts are too small to
outweigh ideological motives or social pressures to conform; (3) the amounts are too small to
compensate for the time and trouble required by the refund process; (4) the fee speech deci-
sions themselves are not well known and the unions are not publicizing them. On the other
hand, the effect of the rule on future organizing efforts must be considered. A union's policy
decision to respond to the loss of unionized workers by making major increases in funds allo-
cated to recruitment could be inhibited by the fear that these allocations might provoke more
refund requests.
The potential erosion of revenues would be diminished if full members could request re-
funds. Many union members value the right to vote in union elections on leadership, contract
terms, and strikes, and would not resign to reduce their dues. Others might do so if the incen-
tive were large enough. In Beck I, for example, the trial court ordered 79% of the defendant's
regular dues refunded. 776 F.2d 1187, 1191-92, 1193, 1194 (4th Cir. 1985). Whether full
members can demand such refunds has not finally been decided. See supra note 57.
118. The antagonism between the common law emphasis on individual liberty and the col-
lective character of labor organization is a persistent theme in the history of American labor
law, and surfaces in rules imposing on unions a duty of fair representation, as well as in the
dues cases. Becker, Book Review, 100 HARv. L. REV. 672 (1987) (reviewing C. TOMINS,
THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985)).
organizational activities, which are so intimately related to the ongoing
strength and health of the collective.
For the Supreme Court, the decision when to give primacy to indi-
vidual rights appears to be guided in part by whether the Court believes
the union is acting "in role" when it engages in the challenged activity.
Treating politics as not "germane" to collective bargaining, irrespective
of the benefits that politics confer, represents a policy judgment that
political activism is simply too remote from the proper role of an agent
certified for collective bargaining rather than political representation.
The statutory version of the rule also implicitly provides a particular
view of the normal and proper role of a labor union. A test that approves
only union activities that are "normally and reasonably employed" to
represent the employees in the unit disfavors activities that are aimed at
altering the balance of power outside the immediate workplace. In other
words, the Court seems to define the union's legitimate role by its mini-
mum statutory duties (representation in labor relations with the immedi-
ate employer) rather than its maximum statutory power (all activities for
"mutual aid and protection"). 119
The narrow definition of the union's role may reflect a common
American theoretical view of the labor union as chiefly a provider of
economic services to individuals rather than as a collective force for in-
creasing the political power of workers.120 Consistently with this view,
119. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Admittedly, the test is addressed to funding for
union acts, rather than to curtailing legal protection for them. Still, it carries a strong sym-
bolic message at the same time as it practically diminishes a union's ability to take advantage
of the law's protection. That § 7 does protect involvement in political and other concerted
action is conceded. See, eg., Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1977):
The 74th Congress knew well enough that labor's cause often is advanced on fronts
other than collective bargaining and grievance settlement within the immediate em-
ployment context. It recognized this fact by choosing, as the language of § 7 makes
clear, to protect concerted activities for the somewhat broader purpose of 'mutual aid
and protection' as well as for the narrower purposes of 'self-organization' and 'collec-
tive bargaining'.
120. Since the 1920s, the dominant theory of the American labor movement has been the
"job-conscious" theory of Selig Perlman and the Commons school. Perlman's theory, taking
its inspiration from the conservative "business unionism" of Samuel Gompers and the AFL,
instructs that the role of the trade union is simply to advance the immediate economic interests
of workers in the workplace by persuading or coercing management to share the profits of the
business. The union resembles a hired business agent more than a force for political or social
liberation, transformation, or revolution. See generally Laslett, The American Tradition of
Labor Theory and its Relevance to the Contemporary Working Class, in LAiSEN & NISSEN,
supra note 88, at 359, 367-70.
Stanley Aronowitz, a modem labor theoretician of the New Left, observes that this con-
servative conception of the role of the American labor movement survived even the militant
industrial unionism of the CIO and the historic passage of the Wagner Act and other broad
pro-worker political reforms of the 1930s:
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some labor theorists and judges have treated union involvement in polit-
ical advocacy as suspect.121 The historical distrust of unions aspolitical
representatives could, by itself, explain the Supreme Court's unwilling-
ness .to find that political activism is germane to collective bargaining.
But it is puzzling that the Court views efforts to organize with the same
suspicion. Organizing is "what unions do"; it is a core activity, not a
marginal activity. Recruiting new members is at the heart of the Ameri-
can labor tradition. While a philosophical preference for voluntarism
and business unionism'22 could explain why the Court discourages
mandatory funding for union politics, it does not offer a reason to with-
draw support for organizing new workers. Organizational speech is, like
union conventions that can be freely funded by dues, more "germane" to
enhancing associational strength and, by its nature, unlikely to present a
cognizable ideological affront. 123 Neither a role concern nor a rights
concern justifies forcing the group to waive its uniform contribution rule.
C. The Government Interest in Facilitation of Organizing
The final reason for permitting free use of dues to fund union elec-
tion drives departs from precedent. Economic arguments did not per-
suade the justices that disallowing organization expenses would create a
significant free rider problem when the question was treated as one of
statutory interpretation. 124  There might be little reason to expect the
American unionism was never put into the theoretical and ideological context of
social transformation because Gompers, the main theoretician of American labor,
understood unions as institutions of industrial citizenship-labor's vehicle to achieve
a greater share of an expanding capitalism rather than a means for opposing the
system as [a] whole.
S. ARONOWITz, WORKING CLASS HERO xv (1983) (emphasis in original).
121. Professor Alan Hyde, pointing to judicial condemnation of union politicking in a vari-
ety of contexts, has argued that political activity of any kind by unions arouses a deep seated
anxiety in the Court and the NLRB. Hyde, supra note 20. This anxiety, he says, has been
expressed by branding union political acts in connection with the workplace as abnormal and
unprotected. Hyde points to an unnecessary and illogical tangle of cases that deal with punish-
ing union distribution of ordinary candidate endorsement pamphlets at the factory, see Local
174, UAW v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1981); denying bargaining rights to employees
of federally funded private programs like Headstart, because political factors make such bar-
gaining "not feasible," see Lutheran Welfare Services v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979),'
denying enforcement to 236 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1978); and denying legal protection to strikes
called as a protest, such as the Longshoremen's refusal to unload Soviet goods after the Af-
- ghanistan invasion, see International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212
(1982).
122. See Hyde, supra note 20, at 13 (separation of politics from collective bargaining in
labor decisions results from "deeply principled sense" of the Board and courts and the unions
themselves that "political unionism is a foreign influence to be kept from our shores").
123. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
1'24. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 453; see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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Court to reach a different result by direct application of the First
Amendment, if eliminating free riders were the sole government interest
acknowledged. But expenditures for organizing also promote a govern-
ment interest in affording the unrepresented an opportunity to choose a
labor association. This interest does not depend on proof that contribu-
tors will benefit from organizing efforts.
Congressional policy favors facilitation of free choice in the election
of an agent for collective bargaining. Yet the potential impact on na-
tional labor policy of the Court's decisions regarding dues has received
no attention in the opinions. That funding limitations might interfere
with the goal of offering workers an opportunity to organize is a concern
that should now be addressed by Congress.
When Congress passed the historic Wagner Act in 1935, its chief
goal was to facilitate workers' free choice of union representation. Sec-
tion 7, the centerpiece of the legislation, stated:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection .... 125
That Congress meant to encourage, as well as to protect, collective bar-
gaining is made explicit in section 1 of the Act:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees ... and
employers.., tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earn-
ers in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive
wage rates and working conditions within and between indus-
tries .... It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to... encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing and [to protect] the exercise by workers of full freedom of asso-
ciation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.126
Although the Act has seen major amendments in the last fifty years, its
central justification has not changed. The Act has, however, been
harshly criticized for failing its central mission. In 1984, the House Sub-
committee on Education and Labor reported that "the evidence is clear
that the law does not encourage collective bargaining. Rather, it has be-
125. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). As noted earlier, the Taft-
Hartley amendments added to § 7 a right to refrain from all of these activities, except to the
extent such a right may be affected by a union shop agreement.
126. Id. § 151 (1982).
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come an impediment."' 27 The recent fiftieth anniversary of the Wagner
Act's passage saw an outpouring of criticism for perceived weaknesses in
the Act's terms and its administration by the NLRB. Most of the criti-
cism is directed to the obstacles placed in the way of new organizing.1 28
The dramatic decline in union strength since the end of World War
II fuels the skepticism of the critics. In 1930, before passage of the Act,
union membership stood at 11.3 percent of non-agricultural employment.
From a high of 35.3 percent in 1947, the proportion of union represented
workers declined to 18 percent in 1985.129 This pattern contrasts sharply
with increases in unionism in most other Western countries, including
Canada. 3 ' Labor economists estimate that because of attrition and
other factors, the union share of the workforce in the United States tends
to decline by 3 percent a year, in the absence of new organization of work-
ers through NLRB elections. 3' With this rate of decline, they estimated
in 1983 that unless current patterns changed, the union share would fall
by the end of the century to barely 10 percent, below 1930 levels.'32
Some economists attribute most of the decline to broad structural
changes in the American economy. Sectors of industry that were highly
unionized have shrunk, while growth has occurred in occupations that
have not historically been unionized.' 33 Decreases in union organizing
efforts in the face of these dislocations, 34 and large increases in lawful
and unlawful management opposition to new organizing 135 constitute
127. Report by House Education and Labor Committee, Labor-Management Relation
Subcommittee on "Failure of Labor Law-A Betrayal of American Workers," reprinted in
Daily Labor Report, No. 193, October 4, 1983, D-5.
128. Weiler, Promises To Keep, supra note 9, at 1769.
129. S. LEVITAN, P. CARLSON, & I. SHAPIRO, PROTECTING AMERICAN WORKERS 145
(BNA 1986), citing statistics supplied by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
130. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 8, at 222.
131. Ia at 241.
132. Id at 242.
133. Freeman and Medoff estimate that 72% of the decline in private unionization, from
over 40% to under 20% of the non-agricultural workforce, is due to structural changes in the
economy. Id. at 225.
134. Correlating declining union expenditures for organization with the union's declining
success rate in these elections indicates that "possibly as much as a third of the decline in
union success through NLRB elections is linked to reduced organizing activity." Id at 229.
135. The remainder of the responsibility for the decline is laid on sharply increased man-
agement resistance, both legal and illegal. Id at 230-242. Resistance raises the financial cost
of organizing considerably, requiring a heavier investment in legal and organizing staff while at
the same time heavy election losses mean fewer new dues-paying members.
Freeman and Medoff estimate that from one-quarter to one-half of the decline in union
electoral success can be attributed to illegal management opposition. Ia at 237. The risk to
workers who exercise their rights under the NLRA to speak out in favor of a union is very
high. Roughly one charge of illegal firing is sustained by the NLRB for every election, or
about one worker in twenty who votes for the union. Id. at 233. Penalties for illegal firings for
two other major contributing factors to the decline. Whatever its causes,
the precipitous decline in the unionized work force can only be countered
with new organizational efforts.
Moreover, unlike political advocacy of workers' interests, unioniz-
ing can only be accomplished by unions themselves. Established unions
with access to dues-supported treasuries bear the bulk of the job. It is, of
course, legally possible for a group of employees to form an independent
labor organization at their place of work without professional assist-
ance, 136 but most call upon the expertise and support of organizers pro-
vided by an existing union.
These governmental interests that distinguish organizational spend-
ing from political spending may be summed up as follows: first, Con-
gress believes that increasing employees' bargaining power is good for
both workers and the economy; second, Congressional policy favors fa-
cilitation of workers' opportunities to exercise a choice about representa-
tion; and third, the present industrial climate makes the need for new
organizing acute. Charging the unwilling minority of employees for or-
ganizing costs might not be justified if these government interests could
be effectively accomplished without requiring their dues. 137 But organiz-
ing cannot be as effectively accomplished with voluntary contributions
alone. The fee speech rule will inevitably undermine Congress' purpose
in the collective bargaining laws, as resources for organizing diminish. 13 1
union activity are very slight. The Board does not award punitive or general damages; awards
of back pay are reduced by any wages the discharged worker has earned between the firing and
the Board's order. The benefits to the employer of avoiding a union contract are virtually
certain to exceed any penalty from breaking the labor laws, resulting in incentives too powerful
for some to resist. Professor Weiler maintains that the remedies administered by the NLRB do
not and cannot stop these abuses. See generally Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 9, at
1774, 1778-90.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 2(5) (1930) (defining labor organization broadly).
137. The Supreme Court has noted:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1976).
138. Even small dollar amounts could have measurable effects: roughly speaking, a ten
percent increase in dollars spent per potential member raises the proportion voting pro-union
by seven percent. Ultimately, whether fee speech rules actually inhibit unions from undertak-
ing new organizing must be tested by empirical research. Analogous research has been re-
ported on the effect on organizing caused by the more drastic "right-to-work" laws, which
relieve workers of paying any amount of dues. See Ellwood and Fine, The Impact of Right-to-
Work Laws on Union Organizing, 95 . OF POL. ECON. 250 (1987). The authors conclude that
passage of a right-to-work law reduces organizing by fifty percent in the first 5 five years after
passage. Id. at 271; R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 8, at 229.
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D. The Effect of the Rule on the Balance of Power
The weakening of union strength also makes more difficult Con-
gress' stated goal of "restoring equality of bargaining power between em-
ployers and employees."' 139 This tendency is aggravated by the fact that
corporate employers do not operate under similar restraints in opposing
unions. For instance, a shareholder who conscientiously disagrees with a
management "union-busting" drive, even an illegal one, has no first
amendment right to a refund of any portion of company profits spent for
that activity. 140
By permitting individual interests to undermine union revenues, the
fee speech rule inevitably enhances the bargaining power of corporations.
As Kenneth Cloke writes:
It is ludicrous to suggest that one may handicap the mouse without
increasing the power of the cat, or that a "neutral" prohibition
against biting, while permitting each animal to scratch, will not
produce the same unequal effect.... In the guise of a neutral labor
policy, the strengths of these combatants have been variously ad-
justed, leaving untouched the unequal distribution of wealth which
continues as an "invisible" hand in politics.... Both by ignoring
the reality of unequal wealth and by providing for a right of nonas-
sociation which only affects union members, the courts are putting
labor at a disadvantage, while corporate funds remain relatively
untouched.141
Cloke's criticism is directed largely at disparities in employers' and
workers' political voice. But the same objection could be made in regard
to organizing expenses. Union elections are no different in this regard
from other political contests; success at the ballot box is likely to be heav-
ily influenced by the amount of money spent on the campaign. Fee
speech rules operate as a campaign finance limit, one that affects the can-
didate, already disadvantaged by poor access to the voters, 42 and that
often (but not always) has fewer financial resources than the opponent
business.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
140. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-95 (1978) (corporate
contributions to influence state ballot proposition campaign cannot constitutionally be prohib-
ited despite speech and associational interests of objecting shareholders); see also Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (striking down state law that prohib-
ited monopoly utility from inserting messages promoting nuclear power into billing envelopes);
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. 1969) (closely held corporation
will not be dissolved under state law because of charitable contribution made over objection of
minority shareholder).
141. Cloke, Mandatory Political Contributions and Union Democracy, 4 IND. REL. L-.
527, 567-68 (1981).
142. See supra note 3.
Neither the labor laws nor the Constitution guarantees equal re-
sources to the combatants in a union electoral drive. But campaign fund-
ing rules which disadvantage only the union competitor make more
difficult Congress' desire to promote "equality of bargaining power"
through freely chosen union representantion.
The Court's treatment of organizing expenses as not chargeable to
the dues of dissenting nonmember employees is not compelled by the
First Amendment and is therefore vulnerable to Congressional amend-
ment. First, exclusion of organizing expenses is not compelled by the
Court's nonlabor precedents, Barnette and Wooley, which condemn
forced, public affirmation of beliefs. Second, under the Abood test, uni-
form subsidization of organizing is justified by the same reasons as for
funding other collective bargaining activity-namely, that organizing is
an indivisible component of the collective bargaining process and results
in concrete benefits to organized workers as a group. Finally, to the ex-
tent that the fee speech doctrine discourages the formation of new un-
ions, it is also at odds with two express Congressional policies: to
facilitate the workers' choice and to promote equality of bargaining
power. The Court has swept organizational expenses into the noncharge-
able category without even weighing the governmental interests that
these Congressional policies advance.
IV. Recommendations
The Supreme Court has just decided that the NLRA does not au-
thorize the private sector union freely to use its resources to increase
union strength. 143 Since this result goes against the union on statutory
grounds, advocates of collective bargaining will certainly urge Congress
to amend the NLRA to clarify its intent with regard to permissible uses
of union shop dues.
Reforms in the labor laws to remove impediments to new organiza-
tion are overdue. Labor apologists are not alone in arguing that reforms
are essential to the survival of unionization in the twentieth century.
Some economists also deplore the decline of American union strength.
Freeman and Medoff believe that both union and non-union shops are
economically as well as socially necessary:
We favor legal changes that will make it easier to unionize because
we believe continued decline in unionization is bad not only for
unions and their members but for the entire society. Because our
research shows that unions do much social good, we believe the
"union-free" economy desired by some business groups would be a
143. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988).
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disaster for the country.... In a well-functioning labor market,
there should be a sufficient number of union and non-union firms
to offer alternative work environments to workers, innovation in
workplace rules and conditions, and competition in the market.
Such competition will, on the one hand, limit union monopoly
power and on the other, limit management's power over
workers.144
If amendments to liberalize judge-made rules are proposed, Con-
gress will need to debate the degree to which the First Amendment ne-
gates some uses of compelled support. Whatever the status of union
politicking, permitting organizational expenses to be charged freely to
dues is constitutionally sound. Any amendment to the RLA or the
NLRA should designate this use of dues as one that a majority of the
membership may authorize.
Congress should consider other adjustments to the balance of bar-
gaining power. It should enact a new section making the union shop
automatic (rather than simply negotiable) for elected unions, just as sec-
tion 9(a) now automatically grants them exclusive representation
rights. 145 At the same time, Congress should repeal the NLRA's permis-
sion for the states to adopt right-to-work laws. These two amendments
would relieve the union of having to negotiate for the right to receive
dues for its collective bargaining functions, and would ensure financial
support from all who now enjoy these services. The net effect would be
to distribute the costs of representation more justly among beneficiaries
and to permit union energy now spent on institutional survival to be di-
rected back to the collective bargaining for which the union was elected.
V. Conclusion
The result of the position advanced in this Article would be to leave
the decision whether to allocate dues to organizing to majority rule of the
employees. This would be democratic. Any democracy-whether a la-
bor organization or a national government-inevitably calls for the sub-
ordination of some individual preferences. Another justification for
majority rule is offered by legal process theory, as promoted by John
Hart Ely, which would make the legitimacy of the outcome for dissenters
depend upon a fair opportunity to participate in the process. 46 A union
144. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 8, at 250.
145. Congress could follow the example of Minnesota and Hawaii, whose public sector
labor laws guarantee unions a level of "fair share" support from all represented workers. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.06, subdiv. 3 (1987) (fair share payment set at 85% of regular
membership dues); HAW. REV. STAT. Title 7, § 89-4 (1986) (service fees required to cover the
costs of negotiating and administering an agreement).
146. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT (1980).
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shop permits two avenues for dissent: employees can opt out by chang-
ing jobs, or they can participate by becoming full members. In addition,
because union officials must adhere to fiduciary standards in every expen-
diture of union funds under the Labor Management Disclosure and Re-
porting Act Section 501,'47 relegating union organizational expenditures
to majority rule does not leave dissenters without legal protection.
The Supreme Court has taken a different view of the rights enjoyed
by dissenters from union spending decisions. Its policy, whether
squarely based upon the First Amendment or merely inspired by the
First Amendment, permits individual employees to avoid the costs of
achieving some of the group's goals, while retaining the benefits of group
membership. It is questionable whether either the Constitution or the
Labor Code requires such a policy for any particular union goal, includ-
ing the goal of political influence. The Court's justifications for the fee
speech rule are at their most vulnerable when the rule is applied to core
union activities such as organizing the unorganized. The causal connec-
tion between increasing the degree of unionization and employee success
at the bargaining table is undeniable. Organizing is demonstrably "ger-
mane" to collective bargaining, and should therefore be freely chargeable
to union shop dues. The present Court disagrees with this conclusion,
purporting, in its latest major opinion, Communications Workers of
America v. Beck, to be guided by the intent of Congress. Beck should
thus be treated by Congress as an open invitation to supply a needed
correction.
147. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1983).
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